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INVOLUNTARY CLONING: A BATTERY
JUNE MARY ZEKAN MAKDISI t
Mr. and Mrs. Jon Jones desperately want a baby. They look
forward to the joys of parenthood, but are fearful of having a
child afflicted with cystic fibrosis-a disease that runs in both of
their families. Would they have to adopt or face an abortion
decision? Was there some magical procedure that could test
their gametes or embryos formed in vitro?
INTRODUCTION
Couples like the Joneses and those plagued by infertility1
have been turning to the latest reproductive technique,
preimplantation genetic diagnosis ("PGD"), for answers. 2 The
information supplied by PGD is utilized by couples and their in
vitro fertilization ("IVF') clinician to determine which embryos
are to be implanted. By submitting to a series of processes that
identify the existence of genes for targeted conditions, unaffected
f Associate Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law; B.A.,
University of Pennsylvania; M.S., University of Pennsylvania; J.D., University of
Tulsa College of Law. The author thanks David F. Forte for his helpful suggestions
and acknowledges, with appreciation, the St. Thomas University School of Law for
providing a research grant.
1 A significant proportion of American society has problems of infertility. See
Alexander N. Hecht, The Wild Wild West: Inadequate Regulation of Assisted
Reproductive Technology, 1 HOuS. J. HEALTH L. & POLY 227, 230 (arguing that
between ten and seventeen percent of American couples cannot procreate in the
usual manner) (citing Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Alternative Means of
Reproduction: Virgin Territory for Legislation, 44 LA. L. REV. 1641 (1984)); Jason
Christopher Roberts, Customizing Conception: A Survey of Preimplantation Genetic
Diagnosis and the Resulting Social, Ethical, and Legal Dilemmas, 2002 DUKE L. &
TECH. REV. 12, 12 (2002) (stating that more than sixteen percent of couples have
difficulty conceiving a child); see also Am. Soc'y of Reprod. Med., Quick Facts about
Infertility, at http://www.asrm.com/Patients/faqs.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2005)
(infertility affects ten percent of population).
2 See Jeffrey R. Botkin, Ethical Issues and Practical Problems in
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 26 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 17, 17 (1998). Many
women who have delayed having families find PGD particularly useful in screening
for chromosomal abnormalities. Id. at 18; see also Richard J. Tasca & Michael E.
McClure, The Emerging Technology and Application of Preimplantation Genetic
Diagnosis, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 7, 8 (1998).
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embryos can be separated out and tagged for implantation in the
intended mother. 3
Formerly, chromosomal abnormalities or diseases, such as
cystic fibrosis, were detected only by post-implantation methods,
such as amniocentesis or chorionic villus sampling. 4 Positive
results from prenatal diagnostic testing required women to
choose between birthing an infant not considered "healthy," or
aborting the fetus. Both options present conundrums for many
women. Thus, technology that allows for preimplantation
diagnosis may be welcomed by some as a way of avoiding either
circumstance. However, if PGD offers such great benefit, why is
it recommended only where there is a risk of serious
abnormality?5
One reason could be that this "state of the art" procedure is
technically demanding, thereby requiring special expertise to be
performed safely and accurately.6 Further, PGD and other
3 See M. Cathleen Kaveny, Cloning and Positive Liberty, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 15, 22 (1999) (noting that a woman who is the intended
mother need not be the progenitor of the human egg).
4 See Sherman Elias, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis by Comparative
Genomic Hybridization, 345 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1569, 1569 (2001). Both these
methods are generally considered "safe" despite the 0.5-1.0 percent of cases
resulting in loss of the fetus. Id. at 1570; see also Tasca & McClure, supra note 2, at
7. Today, there is an additional method that samples fetal cells that are sloughed
naturally from the developing fetus and circulate through the mother's bloodstream.
Karen Sermon & Inge Liebaers, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis and Screening,
in REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE: MOLECULAR, CELLULAR AND GENETIC
FUNDAMENTALS 515, 517 (Bart C.J.M. Fauser et al. eds., 2003) (discussing uterine
lavage). This new procedure is non-invasive. Therefore, unlike amniocentesis, it
does not put developing fetuses at risk of being aborted.
5 Roberts, supra note 1, at 28. Currently, most clinicians agree that the process
should only be used to diagnose the most seriously impaired embryos. Id.
It is unlikely that future use of PGD will be confined to the identification of
serious abnormality in the targeted embryo. As use of genetic technologies
increases, it will become more difficult to restrain its use. Notions of what is normal
and what is enhancement will evolve and standards will become less clear, governed
by a goal of painless and immortal existence. See Leon R. Kass, Triumph or
Tragedy? The Moral Meaning of Genetic Technology, 45 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 11 (2000).
Ironically, Kass notes that the "utopian project will not eliminate suffering but
merely shift it around." Id. at 12. He points out that despite medical advancements
that have attained the goal of prolonging life and alleviating suffering, satisfaction
has not improved. Id.
6 E. Kanavakis & J. Traeger-Synodinos, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis in
Clinical Practice, 39 J. MED. GENETICS 6, 6 (2002), available at http://jmg.bmjjourna
ls.com/cgi/content/full/39/1/6?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=l&RESUL. (last visited
Jan. 13, 2005). It is unclear whether PGD has advanced from the experimental
stage toward standard practice. See Erik Parens & Lori P. Knowles, Reprogenetics
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assisted reproductive technologies ("ART") have become "big
business" 7 despite having bypassed the normal research and
testing phase.s Despite the mixed evaluations of its safety, PGD
has been gaining popularity9 and may soon be considered safe
enough for more widespread use.
Even if considered safe and accurate, 10 PGD poses additional
ethical constraints that may limit its application." In the
& Public Policy: Reflections and Recommendations, 33 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT
S1, S6-S7 (2003) (urging limits similar to those in other countries); Moshe
Zilberstein & Machelle M. Seibel, Preimplantation Genetics and Preimplantation
Diagnosis, in INFERTILITY: A COMPREHENSIVE TEXT 761, 764-65 (Machelle M.
Seibel ed., 2d ed. 1997) ("In reproductive medicine, more than most other areas of
medical practice, the line between clinical innovation and human experimentation
is fuzzy; .... Consequently, reprogenetics raises concerns about the safety.").
7 ART is a four billion dollar industry. Michael J. Malinowski, Choosing the
Genetic Makeup of Children: Our Eugenics Past-Present, and Future?, 36 CONN. L.
REV. 125, 191 (2003); Roberts, supra note 1, at 1. Because ART involves
experimentation with human embryos, it is ineligible for federal funding. Therefore,
the government has no oversight over the manner in which the experimental
procedures are performed. There is no need for approval from an institutional
review board, which would review the research protocol and the documents
providing informed consent. Id.; see also Tasca & McClure, supra note 2, at 8.
8 Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of
Unregulated Biomedical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603, 617-18 (2003). Because
there is no research and testing phase, ART clinics began using techniques without
studying the health consequences on the resulting children. Robin Fretwell Wilson,
Uncovering the Rationale for Requiring Infertility in Surrogacy Arrangements, 29
AM. J.L & MED. 337, 343 (2003). Studies revealed a significant increase in major
birth defects following ART. Id. at 343-46.
9 PGD became feasible in the 1980s. See Kanavakis & Traeger-Synodinos,
supra note 6, at 6. This is amazing considering the first successful in vitro
fertilization baby was not born until 1978. See William W. Bassett, Private Religious
Hospitals: Limitations Upon Autonomous Moral Choices in Reproductive Medicine,
17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 455, 513 (2001).
By 1996, PGD was utilized in very few American centers, and only to detect
severe genetic conditions such as Tay Sachs disease and cystic fibrosis. Only 40
children whose embryos had been subjected to embryo biopsy were born worldwide.
John A. Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, 76 B.U. L. REV.
421, 452 (1996). By 1997, there were thirty centers world-wide that offered the
procedure, which resulted in over one hundred births. Kangpu Xu, Preimplantation
Genetic Diagnosis (PGD), in AN ATLAS OF HUMAN GAMETES AND CONCEPTUSES: AN
ILLUSTRATED REFERENCE FOR ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 97 (Lucinda
L. Veeck ed., 1999). This number has increased to almost 400 births by 2001. David
Cram & David de Kretser, Genetic Diagnosis: the Future, in ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND NEW HORIZONS 186, 195
(Christopher J. De Jonge & Christopher L.R. Barratt eds., 2002).
1o It may be hard to get a true picture of its accuracy since false positives are
likely to be unacknowledged. Andrea Bonnicksen, Genetic Diagnosis of Human
Embryos, in LIFE CHOICES: A HASTINGS CENTER INTRODUCTION TO BIOETHICS 407,
410 (Joseph H. Howell & William F. Sale eds., 2d ed. 2000).
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forefront are concerns about eugenics 12  and genetic
discrimination.13 If PGD permits only "healthy" embryos to be
" John Robertson has suggested that the main objections to PGD are the
burdens on women, the impact on embryos, and the potential for abuse by extension
to less serious conditions. Robertson, supra note 9, at 449; see also Joseph D.
Schulman et al., Preimplantation Genetic Testing for Huntington Disease and
Certain Other Dominantly Inherited Disorders, in CLINICAL GENETICS (1996),
reprinted by Genetics & IVF Inst., http://www.givf.com/pgthuntingtonv.cfm (last
visited Jan. 13, 2005) (noting that PGD is recommended for at-risk couples to screen
out embryos free of the gene for Huntington's disease, affecting only adults);
MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN, WONDERGENES: GENETIC ENHANCEMENT AND THE FUTURE
OF SOCIETY 30, 56 (2003) (PGD is already being used to eliminate embryos with
genes for late-onset diseases and will become important to select for genetic
enhancement). A problem with the application of PGD for genetic enhancement is
the inability to assess the benefit in light of offsetting harms. Id. at 81.
Other concerns relate to a variety of important moral and ethical issues. For
example, there is great concern over inefficient resource allocation. See Vicki G.
Norton, Unnatural Selection: Nontherapeutic Preimplantation Genetic Screening
and Proposed Regulation, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1581, 1610 (1994); Roberts, supra note
1, at 23-24 (2002). Another relates to sanctity of life issues such as whether one is
obliged to transfer all IVF-produced embryos. Guido de Wert, Ethics of Assisted
Reproduction, in REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE: MOLECULAR, CELLULAR AND GENETIC
FUNDAMENTALS 645, 650 (Bart C.J.M. Fauser et al. eds., 2003). There is grave
concern that more embryos are created when PGD will be employed. Jeffrey Botkin,
for example, raised the issue of informed consent concerns as an ethical issue with
respect to the use of PGD. Botkin, supra note 2, at 21. "Genetic diversity may be
affected." Bonnicksen, supra note 10, at 410. Other concerns include the impact on
the gene pool. See Peter H. Huang, Herd Behavior in Designer Genes, 34 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 639, 658 (1999) (applying game theory to demonstrate how to
positively influence parental reprogenetic choice).
12 See Botkin, supra note 2, at 20, 25-26; Rebecca Knox, Preimplantation
Genetic Diagnosis: Disease Control or Child Objectification? 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 435 (2003) (discussing discrimination and objectification of children); Cram &
de Kretser, supra note 9, at 195 (noting that PGD is likely to be used in detecting
desirable physical and social traits). PGD impacts germ-line therapy and genetic
enhancement. Id; see also Robertson, supra note 9, at 450-52. Germ-line
manipulation, issues of genetic discrimination, decreasing genetic diversity, and the
reduction of human dignity are all issues that relate to increased manipulation of
the human genome on the international scale. Jennifer Elle Tauer, International
Protection of Genetic Information: The Progression of the Human Genome Project
and the Current Framework of Human Rights Doctrines, 29 DENVER J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 209, 224-28 (2001). Genetic determinism, which places such great weight on
the effect of a particular genome, links PGD to eugenics. Barbara Katz Rothman,
Not All That Glitters Is Gold, in LIFE CHOICES: A HASTINGS CENTER INTRODUCTION
TO BIOETHICS 423, 430 (Joseph H. Howell & William F. Sale eds., 2d ed. 2000).
13 Roberts, supra note 1, at 13-16. Jeffrey Botkin, for example, raised the issue
of informed consent concerns as an ethical issue with respect to the use of PGD.
Botkin, supra note 2, at 22 (addressing the rejection of those with disabilities). But
see Robertson, supra note 9, at 452. Professor Robertson does not believe that PGD
is likely to be used with sufficient frequency to "affect gender role ratios, cause
discrimination against women or persons with disabilities, or lead to other
[Vol.79:13
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implanted, then those who are born with conditions that would
ordinarily be selected for discard could be viewed as inferior.
This could give rise to a genetic class structure that would be
exacerbated by the inability of lower-income individuals to have
access to the very technology that could improve their status.
14
The fact that IVF yields as many as fifteen embryos 15 allows
parents who can afford the technology to significantly improve
their chances to have an offspring with desirable traits-
especially as PGD becomes available to a wider scope of
conditions. This raises several additional concerns. One of these
is the widening gap between those who can afford the technology
and those who cannot. 16 Another relates to an extension of the
view that the existence of reproductive technology causes women
to be exploited,' 7 children commodified,' 8 and reproduction
dehumanized.' 9 Yet another is the pressure on parents who can
untoward consequences." Id. Prof. Robertson has been involved in the PGD debate
from the very beginning and has been a member of the American Society for
Reproductive Medicine ("ASRM") (or its precursor, the American Fertility Society
("AFS")) since embryo biopsy was announced in 1990.
14 Norton, supra note 11, at 1611-13.
15 See LORI B. ANDREWS, ET AL., GENETICS: ETHICS, LAW AND POLICY 291
(2002). Problematic is the neglect of the potential health problems to women
resulting from of the massive stimulation of the ovaries that is done to produce an
overabundance of embryos from which to select the most perfect. Regine Kollek,
Technicalisation of Human Procreation and Social Living Conditions, in THE
ETHICS OF GENETICS IN HUMAN PROCREATION 139, 145 (Hille Haker & Deryck
Beyleveld, eds. 2000).
16 Maura Ryan, Creating Embryos for Research: On Weighing Symbolic Costs,
in CLONING AND THE FUTURE OF HUMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH 50, 58 (Paul Lauritzen
ed. 2001); Botkin, supra note 2, at 18 (stating that PGD may become a "boutique
service" in the commercial market); Maxwell Mehlman, The Law of Above Averages:
Leveling the New Genetic Enhancement Playing Field, 85 IOWA L. REV. 517, 534,
591 (2000); Roberts, supra note 1, at 5.
17 See, e.g., Michael Prowse, Ethical Decisions Must be Made Before Science
Forces Them on Us, FINANCIAL TIMES (LONDON), July 5, 2003, at 13 (stating that
humans are becoming instrumentalized with the help of practitioners).
18 ROBERT BLANK & JANNA C. MERRICK, HUMAN REPRODUCTION, EMERGING
TECHNOLOGIES, AND CONFLICTING RIGHTS 15-17 (1995); Barry Nelson, Happy
Families by Design, NORTHERN ECHO, June 20, 2003, at 10 (on reserve with author);
Vicki Norton, Allowing Parents to Genetically Screen Embryos is Unethical, in
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 115, 118-19 (Carol Wekesser et al. eds., 1996) (non-
therapeutic exploitation compared to slavery); Norton, supra note 11, at 1604, 1610
(implying that children are used as commodities based on selecting specific traits or
because of tissue-match potential); Roberts, supra note 1, 23-24.
19 Kass, supra note 5, at 10. Kass notes that under the guise of "benevolent
humanitarianism," reproduction is moving from procreation to manufacture.
Reducing the embryo to a "product" enables control over it to be transferred among
interests, including economic ones. Procreation is thereby dehumanized and nascent
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afford the technology to use it to the fullest extent possible to
avoid being seen as "neglectful" toward their children.20 Will
there be additional pressure from insurance lobbies or
government for couples at risk to refrain from producing
offspring with serious disabilities? 21
Although the current ethos is to offer PGD only where there
is a risk of serious abnormality, its use has already been
expanded. PGD has been utilized to select embryos for their
matching-tissue stem cells. 22 It has also been used for gender
selection. 23 It is conceivable that reproduction rights advocates
will press for PGD application in a variety of contexts: less
human life has been commodified. Id. See also Owen D. Jones, Allowing Parents to
Genetically Screen Embryos Can Be Ethical, in REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 138,
139 (Carol Wekesser et al. eds., 1996). ART's focus on "product" rather than
"process" makes the distinction between reproduction and production disappear. Id.
20 See George Annas, Turning Point for the Human Species, TRIAL 24, 27-29
(July 2001) (discussing parental incentive to utilize some "cloning technique"
(presumably PGD) to make their children "better"). See also Sonia Mateu Suter, The
Routinization of Prenatal Testing, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 233, 255 (2002) (where the
routinization of prenatal testing results in an "illusion of choice" as what should be
an option becomes more like an imposition). But see Robertson, supra note 9, at 452
(doubting that many will take advantage of PGD for trait selection).
21 Anita Cecchin, Genetic Screening of Embryos: An Overview, in
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 111, 113 (Carol Wekesser et al. eds., 1996).
22 ANDREWS, supra note 15, at 291. Several children have been conceived with
the specific purpose of producing a child whose tissue would have a great potential
for matching that of a diseased sibling. LYNDA BECK FENWICK, PRIVATE CHOICES,
PUBLIC CONSEQUENCES: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY AND THE NEW ETHICS OF
CONCEPTION, PREGNANCY, AND FAMILY 166-69 (1998) (chronicling the genetically
engineered matches for Anissa Ayala and Natalie Curry). In 2000, parents Lisa and
Jack Nash utilized PGD in conjunction with IVF to assure a proper tissue match for
their daughter, who suffered from Fanconi anemia. ANDREWS, supra note 15, at
291-92. See also Susan M. Wolf, Jeffrey P. Kahn, & John E. Wagner, Using
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis to Create a Stem Cell Donor: Issues, Guidelines
& Limits, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 327 (2003) (discussing the implications of utilizing
pre-implantation HLA-matching).
23 Gina Kolata, Ethics Specialist Supports Some Sex Selection, MIAMI HERALD,
Sept. 28, 2001, at 13A. The Genetics & lVF Institute, which offers PGD services,
advertises gender selection for gender balancing. See Genetics & IVF Inst.,
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis for Family Balancing, at http:/www.givf.comlgen
der selection.cfm (last visited Jan. 13, 2005). ASRM ethics committee chair John
Robertson clarified that the Society's position on gender selection had changed from
"discouraged" in 1999 to "acceptable," at least insofar as it allowed the couple to
select an embryo that was the opposite sex than its "sibling." Kolata, supra, at 13A.
Currently, PGD solely for selecting an offspring's gender is being offered by clinics.
Helen M. Alvare, The Case for Regulating Collaborative Reproduction: A Children's
Rights Perspective, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 23-24 (2003); June Mary Zekan
Makdisi, Genetically Correct: The Political Use of Reproductive Terminology, 32
PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1, 31-32 (2004).
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serious illnesses, late-onset diseases, and, as genes are identified
for merely desirable traits, for those as well.2
4
Hidden among all these weighty concerns and overshadowed
by them is yet another troubling issue: the process that permits
preimplantation genetic diagnosis requires the separation and
destruction of a totipotent cell25 that itself has the potential to
develop into a separate human being.26 This creation of what
some have classified as a "clone" or "twin" is controversial-that
it occurs with knowledge of impending destruction likewise
raises troubling moral and ethical concerns.27  This Article
addresses this issue and analyzes it in the legal context of
consent.
Part I provides an overview of the medical procedures
relating to embryo biopsy, preimplantation diagnosis, and the
consequent creation of a blastomere clone. Part II describes a
framework for the application of consent to PGD. 28 Finally,
based on the criteria needed for consent, the article analyzes
whether clinicians who fail to provide information that a clone is
24 See MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN, WONDERGENES: GENETIC ENHANCEMENT AND
THE FUTURE OF SOCIETY 56 (2003). PGD is already being used to avoid implanting
embryos with late-onset Huntington disease as well as genetically caused
Alzheimer's. Id. at 56, 174. Although trait-enhancement is not now available
through PGD, evidence of its use for that purpose should such genetic tests be
developed is likely given the interest in obtaining gametes from humans with
desirable traits. See id. at 56.
25 See MOSBY'S NURSING & ALLIED HEALTH DICTIONARY 1728 (6th ed. 2002)
[hereinafter MOSBY'S] (describing totipotency as "the ability of a cell, particularly a
zygote, to differentiate into any of a number of specialized cells and thus form a new
organism or regenerate a body part").
26 See infra, notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
27 See William FitzPatrick, Surplus Embryos, Nonreproductive Cloning, and the
Intend/Foresee Distinction, HASTINGS CENTER REP. 29, 29-30 (May-June 2003).
The article indicates that some believe that creating clones for research purposes is
indistinguishable from the creation of embryos in the IVF setting. The author
disagrees. In IVF, the purpose is to create embryos for reproductive purposes. That
some will be destroyed is merely foreseeable, but not intended. Thus, by operation of
the principal of double effect, it may be ethically sound. See A.B. Shaw, Two
Challenges to the Double Effect Doctrine: Euthanasia and Abortion, 28 J. MED.
ETHICS 102, 102 (2002) (explaining that the principle of double effect morally allows
actions with both good and bad effects). By contrast, no double effect applies to
embryos created for research purposes. It is not merely foreseeable that some will be
destroyed. All will be destroyed; the intent cannot be to reproduce. See FitzPatrick,
supra, at 30-31. This has direct application to PGD. Once the totipotent cell is
separated from its "parent" embryo, it is certain to be destroyed because it cannot
survive the testing process.
28 See Botkin, supra note 2, at 25.
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formed during the PGD process expose themselves to liability in
negligence, under a theory of lack of informed consent, or in
battery, based on the absence of consent.
I. WHAT IS PGD AND How is IT ACCOMPLISHED?
Preimplantation genetic diagnosis, originally developed as
an extension of prenatal diagnosis, 29 is possible because of IVF
technology. 30 While the aims of IIVF are to join eggs and sperm
outside the human body, the aim of PGD is to evaluate those
embryos and, on that basis, to select the most desirable embryos
for transfer. 31 Initially, the purpose of PGD was to diagnose-
and thereby eliminate-embryos with serious genetic diseases.3 2
The only diseases that have the chance of being detected are
those for which tests have been developed and applied during the
PGD process. 33 To accomplish the diagnosis, two steps must be
performed: the removal of a portion of the IVF-produced embryo,
and the application of a diagnostic test.34
A. Embryo Biopsy
The removal process is typically described as performing a
"biopsy"35 on the embryo-either a "blastomere biopsy," or
29 Elias, supra note 4, at 1570.
30 Xu, supra note 9, at 97.
31 de Wert, supra note 11, at 650.
32 Jeffrey R. Botkin, Prenatal Diagnosis and the Selection of Children, 30 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 265, 280-81 (2003). The technology allowed couples to potentially
avoid facing an abortion decision if PGD accurately diagnosed genetic disease prior
to implantation. Id.
33 Botkin, supra note 2, at 19. The accuracy rate varies. It has been estimated
that between 10-20% of the tests are unsuccessful either because of unsuccessful
PCR amplification (10%), allelic drop out when the DNA of single blastomeres are
amplified (20%), or because of the technical difficulties of the FISH technique that is
used for detecting chromosomal abnormalities (15%). Kanavakis & Traeger-
Synodinos, supra note 6, at 8.
34 See Kanavakis & Traeger-Synodinos, supra note 6, at 6-7.
35 Magdalena Bielanska et al., Chromosomal Information Derived from Single
Blastomeres Isolated from Cleavage-Stage Embryos and Cultured In Vitro, 79
FERTILITY & STERILITY 1304, 1304-05 (2003).
It is also possible to apply testing to blastocysts that were fertilized in utero.
Before the blastocysts have implanted into the womb, they are washed from the
uterus and "tested." Sermon & Liebaers, supra note 4, at 517 (arguing that uterine
lavage is disappointing because of the paucity of cells collected). Embryos without
the undesirable characteristics are reinserted into the womb for normal growth and
development. Because only naturally sloughed cells are subject to testing, no
totipotent cells are removed. Thus, the moral issues relating to blastomere
INVOL UNTAR Y CL ONING: A BATTER Y
"cleavage-stage biopsy."36 This occurs on the second or third day
post in vitro fertilization, when the embryo has developed into a
mass of between six and ten cells.3 7 An opening is made in the
zona pellucida that surrounds the developing embryo, and one or
two of the cells-known as blastomeres-are removed.38  While
several removal techniques currently exist, the method first
employed-aspiration through a micropippette39-is still the
most popular. 40
separation do not attach.
36 LUCINDA L. VEECK, AN ATLAS OF HUMAN GAMETES AND CONCEPTUSES: AN
ILLUSTRATED REFERENCE FOR ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 193 (1999)
(blastomere biopsy); Sermon & Liebaers, supra note 4, at 516 (cleavage-stage
biopsy). On day one of in vitro fertilization, the sperm is combined with the egg. The
penetrating sperm and oocyte (or egg) chromosomes come together as pronuclei
surrounded by a nuclear membrane. The pronuclei then fuse, forming a single
nucleus contained in the single-celled embryo, called a zygote. The zygote is unlike
either the haploid egg, with its 23-chromosomal component, or the haploid sperm,
with its haploid chromosomal component. The zygote has again become diploid, like
each of its parents, with the full complement of 46 chromosomes. But the zygote's
chromosomal component, that was derived from each biological parent, is unique.
The zygote then grows by mitosis, which is the same process of dividing that occurs
in all other somatic cells. Two diploid daughter cells are formed, each of which is
called a blastomere. Each of these mitotic divisions that are part of the
developmental process of the embryo is called a cleavage division. See Zilberstein &
Seibel, supra note 6, at 763.
37 See VEECK, supra note 36, at 193; Sermon & Liebaers, supra note 4, at 516-
17 (arguing that there are seven or more cells); see also MARJORIE A. ENGLAND,
LIFE BEFORE BIRTH 4 (2nd ed. 1996) (describing the stages of embryonic
development).
38 See VEECK, supra note 36, at 193; Sermon & Liebaers, supra note 4, at 516-
17. Twenty-five percent of the embryo's cell mass can be safely removed. This can
amount to one blastomere from a 4-cell stage, or up to 2 from an embryo at the 8-cell
stage. Zilberstein & Seibel, supra note 6, at 767; see also Alan R. Thornhill & Karen
Snow, Molecular Diagnostics in Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 4 J.
MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 11, 13 (2002), available at http://jmd.amjpathol.org/cgico
ntent/full/4/l/11 (last visited Jan. 13, 2005). Blastomeres are generally aspirated out
through a glass micropipette attached to a suction system. Id. (providing an
exhaustive description of the various techniques of PCR, FISH, and whole genome
hybridization techniques).
39 Elias, supra note 4, at 1570. Alan H. Handyside, a pioneer in the field,
reported the technique in 1989. Id. at 1570-71, 1571 n.3. He and his colleagues
described the sexing of preimplantation embryos at risk for a sex-linked disease
followed by the births of several female, healthy babies. Id.
Professor Scott describes an inherent flaw in using law to resolve ethical
dilemmas. A result is that legal rules establish minimum conduct while ethical
ideals are likely to be lost. The focus turns away from an ethical resolution and
toward avoiding the legal "punch" received when conduct falls below the legally
minimal standard. Charity Scott, Why Law Pervades Medicine: An Essay on Ethics
in Health Care, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLy 245, 245, 273-74, 295-96
(2000). When applied to manipulations of the early embryo, the ethical standard of
2005]
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B. Diagnostic Testing
Once the blastomere is removed, it is prepared for diagnostic
testing41 for one of three major categories 42 of genetic disease:
sex-linked diseases (such as Duchenne's muscular dystrophy),
chromosomal disorders (such as Down's syndrome), or single
gene mutations (such as cystic fibrosis and sickle cell anemia).43
"respect" becomes meaningless. In its place arises the legal rule which does not
punish manipulation of embryos unless the embryo has attained the developmental
age of 14 days, which also corresponds to the time of implantation.
40 Sermon & Liebaers, supra note 4, at 516.
41 Currently, there are at least 48 PGD-testable conditions including
achondroplasia (dwarfism), Franconi's anemia, spinal/bulba muscular atrophy,
Becker's muscular dystrophy, hemophilia A and B, phenylketonuria, early-onset
Alzheimer's, Gaucher's disease, Marfan's syndrome, Fragile X syndrome and
Thalassemia. Luca Gianaroli et al., Preimplantation Genetics in Human
Embryology, in BIOTECHNOLOGY OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION, 301, 304 (Alberto
Revelli et al. eds., 2003).
Genetic diagnosis of a polar body, which is a small cell that is naturally shed by
the much larger oocyte during meiotic division, may be performed instead. Thornhill
& Snow, supra note 38. Information provided by genetic testing of the biopsied polar
body does not include an assessment of the male's genetic contribution to an embryo
produced with the egg that shed the polar body. Because polar body biopsy does not
involve totipotent cells, see id., none of the issues discussed in this paper are
impacted by polar body biopsy.
42 Frances A. Flinter, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: Needs to be Tightly
Regulated, 322 BMJ 1008-09 (2001), available at http:/fbmj.com/cgi/content/full/322/
7293/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2005). See Norton, supra note 11, at 1588-92 (providing
an excellent and understandable biological description of the origins of genetic
diseases).
43 Flinter, supra note 42, at 1009; Xu, supra note 9, at 98-99. Other sex-linked
diseases that can be detected by FISH include Lesch Nyhan syndrome. Other
conditions related to improper chromosomal number include Turner syndrome,
which can appear when only one "' chromosome is present. Other autosomal
recessive disorders, or those related to single gene mutations, include Tay Sachs
disease, Rh D blood typing, thalassemia, and sickle cell anemia. Joy D. A. Delhanty
et al., Genetic Diagnosis Before Implantation: Applications of the Technique are
Growing, 315 BMJ 828 (1997), available at http://bmj.com/cgi/content/full/315/7112/
828 (last visited Jan. 13, 2005). Not long ago an embryo was tested for the
Alzheimer's gene. Several ethical issues surrounded the case. First, PGD was
supposed to be performed only on embryos at risk for serious disease. Here, if
permitted to survive, the condition would appear only after several decades. Second,
some questioned whether any parent who themselves would succumb to the
genetically caused early-onset Alzheimer's disease should utilize ART to create a
child that they would be unable to care for. Jerome Groopman, Designing Babies,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2002, at A14. See generally Tasca & McClure, supra note 2, at
9-10 (describing cystic fibrosis, Tay-sachs disease, Duchenne's, fragile X syndrome,
and Down syndrome).
There is some disagreement as to whether PGD is considered experimental or
standard of care. Fertility specialists seem to consider PGD standard practice. See
Thornhill & Snow, supra note 38, at 11, 11 n.147. Current medical textbook authors
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Sex-linked conditions may be eliminated by implanting only
female embryos. 44 Thus, embryos containing the male "XY"'
chromosomal pairing are eliminated, while embryos containing
the female "XX" pairing are selected for possible implantation.
In order to examine the genetic or chromosomal components
of the blastomere, its DNA must be removed, thereby destroying
the cell.45 To check for chromosomal abnormality, fluorescent
"probes" are added to the DNA and coaxed to bind with specific
chromosomes in a technique called "fluorescence in situ
hybridization" ("FISH").46 The fluorescent markers make the
targeted chromosomes readily visible, thereby enabling
researchers to determine the sex as well as whether the
chromosomes targeted for inspection have been properly
paired. 47 Inappropriate pairings (such as "X" or "XXY"' instead of
"XX" or "XX'), called "aneuploidy,"48 are responsible for causing
conditions such as Down's syndrome. 49 Noting an absence of
chromosomal abnormality in a blastomere suggests that its
and some others seem to feel it is still experimental. See, e.g., de Wert, supra note
11, at 656; Botkin, supra note 2, at 18. There is no consensus on which of the
various mutation detection strategies should be used to evaluate the presence of any
particular disease, even among those who consider PGD a standard of care. See
Thornhill & Snow, supra note 38, at 24-25.
44 See R.G. Edwards & Ruth E. Fowler, Human Embryos in the Laboratory, 223
Sci. AM. 4454 (1970); Sermon & Liebaers, supra note 4, at 516 (first clinical use of
PGD was on sex embryos who were at risk of having sex-linked diseases).
45 de Wert, supra note 11, at 650; Rebecca Kolberg, Human Embryo Cloning
Reported, 262 SCIENCE 652, 653 (1993); Fr. Germain Kopaczynski, Preimplantation
Genetic Diagnosis, 27 ETHICS & MEDICS 1, 1 (2002).
46 See NHGRI Fact Sheet, Fluorescen In Situ Hybridization (FISH) available at
http://www.accessexcellence.org/RC/VL/GG/nhgriPDFs/fishTXT.pdf (last visited
Jan. 13, 2005).
47 Gianaroli et al., supra note 41, at 303. Utilizing the FISH technique enables
the examination of about nine chromosomes, including the sex chromosomes X and
Y, as well as 13, 15, 16, 18, 21, and 22. Id. FISH also enables the detection of other
chromosomal abnormalities such as translocations and inversions. Flinter, supra
note 42, at 1009. New approaches seek to analyze the entire chromosomal
complement via comparative genomic hybridization ("CGH"). Inge Liebaers & Joe
Leigh Simpson, Genetic Counseling in Reproductive Disorders, in REPRODUCTIVE
MEDICINE: MOLECULAR, CELLULAR AND GENETIC FUNDAMENTALS 497, 510 (Bart
C.J.M. Fauser et al. eds., 2003). In CGH, the entire genome is amplified and
compared with a control cell's DNA. Each is labeled with a different fluorescent
marker before amplification. If the colors of any of the chromosomes are not in a 1:1
proportion following amplification, it indicates that the chromosome is aneuploid
and, therefore, abnormal. Id.
48 See MOSBY'S, supra note 25, at 95 (stating that aneuploidy is "any variation
in chromosome number that involves individual chromosomes").
49 Xu, supra note 9, at 97 (discussing a trisomy of chromosome 21).
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embryonic twin would also be free of the abnormality. 50
Therefore, the embryos from which those blastomeres were
derived are the ones selected for implantation. Presently, the
largest category of chromosomal abnormality generating the use
of FISH techniques constitutes women whose age causes them to
be at a greater risk of producing eggs with chromosomal
abnormalities. 51
Inspecting for single-point mutations parallels the
methodology used in crime labs. Once the DNA is extracted from
a blastomere, sections of the DNA molecule, in which the
mutation under investigation would appear, are amplified over a
billion times by the polymerase chain reaction ("PCR") process. 52
Again, if the blastomere is diagnosed with the condition, then its
embryonic twin is also expected to be affected. Only embryos
corresponding to unaffected blastomeres are likely to be selected
for implantation.
C. Physical Intervention Related to PGD and the Nature of the
Consent Given
As described above, significant physical intervention occurs
in connection with PGD. Women must endure dangerous
50 Occasionally, mosaicism exists whereby the embryonic chromosomal
component is paired differently than its removed blastomere. Sermon & Liebaers,
supra note 4, at 516. Thus, to assure the non-existence of a particular set of
conditions, pre-natal, in utero testing might still need to be performed.
51 Kanavakis & Traeger-Synodinos, supra note 6, at 6-7 (placing the amount at
about half). Women are born with a complete set of eggs. Unlike sperm, which are
produced cyclically, a woman's eggs are as old as the woman. As the mechanism
that directs meiotic division during egg ripening also ages, mistakes are more likely.
Thus, during meiotic division, chromosomes do not always separate properly.
Chromosomal abnormalities may also be tested before an embryo is created. During
the meiotic division whereby an egg is created, smaller polar bodies are naturally
discarded. These also contain the equivalent genetic material and may be tested
instead of the severed blastomere. See Inst. for Reprod. Med. & Sci. of Saint
Barnabas, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD) for Aneuploidy, at http://www.s
bivf.compgd-aneuploidy.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2005).
52 Gianaroli et al., supra note 41, at 303; Xu, supra note 9, at 98 (detailing how
PCR is used to detect single-gene mutations). The blastomere is placed in a
microcentrifuge tube, which contains a chemical solution that aids in extracting the
DNA. Gianaroli et al., supra note 41, at 303. The PCR process is also used to
amplify DNA samples found at crime scenes (usually from blood) in order to match
genes to the victim or alleged perpetrator. See Edward J. Imwinkelried & D.H.
Kaye, DNA Typing: Emerging or Neglected Issues, 76 WASH. L. REV. 413, 471
(2001); Peter Neufeld, Preventing the Execution of the Innocent: Testimony Before
the House Judiciary Committee, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1155, 1161 n.47 (2001).
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hormonal treatments to ripen multiple eggs simultaneously. 53
Further, they must undergo surgery-generally laparoscopic-to
harvest the ripened ova.54 Men must provide the sperm that
mixes with the eggs. Following fertilization, the embryos must
be subjected to microsurgery to remove the blastomeres, which
themselves are subjected to caustic chemicals. 55 To avoid
liability for the complex series of manipulative "touching,"
consent must be obtained. 56
What constitutes consent to PGD? If a clinician discloses
the risks of harm the parents or embryos may encounter at each
step along the way, then negligence liability may be avoided
because consent will have been "informed."57 But is disclosure of
those risks all that is required? What if information about a
major feature of the touching were incomplete? Would that
render consent invalid? Application to a common experience
suggests that it would. Suppose, for example, that a washroom
attendant handed a towel to a patron. The patron agrees to
accept the towel's touch for the purpose of drying her hands. But
what if the attendant had just sneezed into the towel? Although
the purpose of drying hands is accomplished, the germ-laden
53 LORI B. ANDREWS, THE CLONE AGE: ADVENTURES IN THE NEW WORLD OF
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 50-54 (1999). Superovulation is achieved by
administering LH (leutinizing hormone) through nasal spray or through
subcutaneous injection along with r-FSH. This occurs daily until several follicles
have attained 18 mm in diameter. Then hCG is self-injected. Michael C. Macnamee
& Peter R. Brinsden, Superovulation Strategies in Assisted Conception, in A
TEXTBOOK OF IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND ASSISTED REPRODUCTION: THE BOURN
HALL GUIDE TO CLINICAL AND LABORATORY PRACTICE 91, 94 (Peter R. Brinsden ed.,
2d ed. 1999).
54 See Patricia M. McShane, In Vitro Fertilization, GIFT and Related
Technologies-Hope in a Test Tube, in EMBRYOS, ETHICS AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS 31,
43 (E. Baruch et al. eds., 1987).
55 See Inst. for Reprod. Med. & Sci. of Saint Barnabas, supra note 51.
56 See David M. Vukadinovich, Assisted Reproductive Technology Law:
Obtaining Informed Consent for the Commercial Cryopreservation of Embryos, 21 J.
LEGAL MED. 67, 68-77 (2000) (discussing the potential liability that medical
facilities are exposed to and possible ways to avoid future litigation); DAN B. DOBBS,
THE LAW OF TORTS 53-55 (2001) (discussing battery liability for medical
interventions).
57 See Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Informed Decision Making and the
Law of Torts: The Myth of Justiciable Causation, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 607, 618
(1988) (explaining that informed consent is usually relevant only when undisclosed
risks caused harm); Vukadinovich, supra note 56, at 69 (advising that a doctor
"must explain to the patient the nature of the procedure or treatment, the risks and
possible complications, the expected benefits, and the alternative treatments or
procedures and their risks and benefits").
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nature of the towel changes the nature of the touch because the
instrument of wiping has unexpectedly become a vehicle of
infection. Since knowledge of the towel's contamination would
render the otherwise consented-to touch offensive, the
undisclosed fact of contamination would be material to a decision
to be touched by the towel offered. Similarly, the nature of a
sexual touching is altered if a party who is knowingly fertile
asserts that he is sterile. 58 In the medical context, if a physician
were to recommend transurethral prostate resectioning to
resolve a urinary problem, must not the known certain
consequence of sterility also be disclosed? If the sterility
component that is a characteristic nature of the touch is not
disclosed, and if it is material to the decision to undergo the
procedure, then non-disclosure invalidates consent and subjects
the physician to liability in battery.5 9 That is the test: facts that
characterize the nature of the touching, and which are material
to the decision to accept the touch, must be disclosed.
Nondisclosure negates consent, and subjects the actor to liability
in battery.60
Is there some material fact about the nature of PGD that
must be disclosed to avoid subjecting clinicians to battery
actions? PGD is presented as a method providing insight into
the genetic and chromosomal components of embryos that are
produced by means of IVF.61 Descriptions artfully explain that
blastomeres will be removed from six- to eight-celled embryos
and, focusing on the embryo originator, represent that risks to
58 See Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 425 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)
(finding that the ability to produce the resultant consequence-pregnancy--changed
the nature of the touching).
59 See Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 88 N.W.2d 186, 190 (Minn. 1958)
(stating that known consequence of sterilization was material to the nature of the
procedure).
60 See DOBBS, supra note 56, at 232 (2001) (referencing Bartell v. State, 82
N.W. 142, 143 (Wis. 1900) (where a nude massage was given or where physical
violence was passed off as "therapeutic"); see also Rains v. Superior Court, 198 Cal.
Rptr. 249, 253-54 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (finding liability for nondisclosure where
physical violence was allegedly "therapeutic").
61 See, e.g., Ctr. for Genetics and Soc'y, Other Human Genetic and Reproductive
Technologies: Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD) and Screening, available at
htpp://www.genetics-and-society.org/technologies/other/pgd.html (last visited Jan.
13, 2005); Genetics & IVF Inst., supra note 23; Inst. for Reprod. Med. & Sci. of Saint
Barnabas, supra note 26; Reprogenetics, About Reprogenetics: Everything Associated
with PGD, available at http://www.reprogenetics.com/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2005).
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the embryo are minimal.62 Consent, one can argue, has been
informed. But the descriptions may not sufficiently address
other aspects of the procedure that are both characteristic to its
nature and material to the decision to authorize PGD.
Focusing on the embryo may inadvertently or purposefully
divert attention from a certain consequence of the embryo biopsy
touching. The same peculiarity of the early stage embryo that
enables it to retain a full panoply of information, despite the
removal of up to one quarter of its contents, applies equally to
the removed cell. It also is totipotent.63 The significance of this
totipotency is that, unlike the stem cells removed from a
developing blastocyst, 64 each of the blastomeres removed from
these earlier stage embryos has the potential to differentiate and
form not only the organism, but the "extra-embryonic
membranes and other tissues" that are necessary to support
62 See, e.g., Inst. for Reprod. Med. & Sci. of Saint Barnabas, supra note 51. The
Institute for Reproductive Medicine and Science of Saint Barnabas, which performs
PGD, does discuss totipotency of blastomeres and its non-deleterious effect on the
embryo, but does not meaningfully address its significance to the severed
blastomere:
No part of the future fetus will be lacking because one or two cells are
removed from the embryo approximately two days after fertilization. All
the cells of the embryo remain totipotent until about the fourth
day.... [E]ach cell by itself can grow into a whole and perfect fetus. The
procedure merely delays continued cell division for a few hours, after
which the embryo reaches the same number of cells as before and
continues its normal development.
Id. See also IntegraMed Am., PGD (Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis) Can Help
Avoid Genetic Birth Defects Such as Cystic Fibrosis, at http://www.integramed.coml
consumer/preimplan.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2005); Or. Health & Sci. Univ.,
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD), at http://www.fertilityoregon.com/lab/pre
_implantation.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2005) (stating that the embryo is not
harmed). An article by Linda Hammer Burns on counseling describes PGD as
follows: "one or two cells of an embryo created via IVF are biopsied and tested." It
then notes the beneficial avoidance of abortion as well as its comparative success
and accuracy rates. Linda Hammer Burns, Genetics and Infertility: Psychosocial
Issues in Reproductive Counseling, 17 FAM., SYS. & HEALTH 87, 102 (1999).
63 Howard W. Jones et al., On Attempts at Cloning in the Human, 61 FERTILITY
& STERILITY 423, 423 (1994); Kopaczynski, supra note 45, at 1.
64 See Peter R. Brinsden, Oocyte Recovery and Embryo Transfer Techniques for
In Vitro Fertilization, in A TEXTBOOK OF IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND ASSISTED
REPRODUCTION: THE BOURN HALL GUIDE TO CLINICAL AND LABORATORY PRACTICE
171, 181 (Peter R. Brinsden ed., 2d ed. 1999). During the blastocyst stage, the outer
layer, or trophectoderm, forms the extraembryonic structure that surrounds the
embryo and attaches to the uterine wall. The inner cell mass of the blastocyst forms
the embryo. Id. Blastomeres removed from blastocysts for stem cell purposes have
already lost some of the ability of flexible development. This change in ability for a
blastomere of a later age is certain to be lost on lay persons.
2005]
ST. JOHN'S LAWREVIEW [Vol.79:13
fetal development.6 5  This cellular totipotency is what allows
zygotes to split early in development and thereby form identical
twins. In fact, a newly formed zygote is itself the functional
equivalent of a totipotent cell-one that can develop into an
embryo and supporting tissue.66  In short, the process of
blastomere separation, or embryo biopsy, in biological reality,
constitutes the creation of a blastomeric "clone" or "twin."67
When successful blastomere separation was first announced,
the creation of a clone was openly acknowledged.68  The
announcement created controversy. 69
65 See Miranda Biven, Administrative Developments: NIH Backs Federal
Funding for Stem Cell Research, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 95, 95 (1999) (explaining
the significance of totipotency). Similarly, Mosby's medical dictionary defines the
term as: "an entity capable of carrying on life functions." MOSBY'S, supra note 25, at
1233.
66 President's Council on Bioethics, Human Cloning and Human Dignity: An
Ethical Inquiry, ch.3, 9 (July, 2002), available at http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/cl
oningreport/terminology.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2005). It is the "functional"
equivalent because "zygote" refers to a stage immediately following the union of egg
and sperm, which is essential for biological growth of a new being. Id. While there is
no egg/sperm union, the stage created by SCNT is identical insofar as growth of an
embryo begins. See id. at 8-9; see also June Mary Zekan Makdisi, The Slide From
Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research to Reproductive Cloning: Ethical Decision-
Making and the Ban on Federal Funding, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 463, 485-86 (2003).
67 Kopaczynski, supra note 45, at 1. The explanation for this phenomenon is
that blastomeres that are "biopsied," unlike those relating to SCNT cloning, result
from indeterminate cleavage. Id. Mosby's Medical Dictionary defines "indeterminate
cleavage" as "mitotic division of the fertilized ovum into blastomeres that have
similar developmental potential and, if isolated, can give rise to a complete
individual embryo." MOSBY'S, supra note 25, at 885. Blastomeres derived from cells
produced during the early embryonic cellular divisions each may develop into an
individual embryo. Id. By contrast, SCNT clones derive their blastomeres from
blastocysts. At that stage, the blastomeres have already begun to differentiate.
Thus, each blastomere is only pluripotent. Removal of blastomeres at that stage,
unlike with respect to PGD, destroys the embryo from which it is withdrawn. See
also Makdisi, supra note 66, at 485-86.
68 See RICHARD J. DEVINE, GOOD CARE, PAINFUL CHOICES: MEDICAL ETHICS
FOR ORDINARY PEOPLE 134-35 (2d ed. 2000); LOIS WINGERSON, UNNATURAL
SELECTION: THE PROMISE AND THE POWER OF HUMAN GENE RESEARCH 80 (1998);
Jones, supra note 63, at 423, 424 (acknowledging cloning, but preferring to reserve
the word "clone" for nuclear transplantation). The first public cloning report
occurred at the annual meeting of the American Fertility Society in Montreal in
1993. There, Jerry Hall, director of the In Vitro Fertilization and Andrology
Laboratory at George Washington University School of Medicine in Washington,
D.C, delivered his paper describing the creation of 48 embryos derived from 17 two-
to eight-celled IVF embryos. Although few had survived to the implantation stage of
development, it proved that it could be done. Rebecca Kolberg, supra note 45, at
652.
Those who have acknowledged that the process produced clones included Hall,
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Scientists have not reversed their original position that
clones are produced during the process. As stated in one medical
textbook: "The individual blastomeres of the embryo are
totipotent: they have exactly the same developmental potential
as an embryo. Therefore, isolating a blastomere involves the
creation of a second, duplicate embryo, which will be destroyed
during the diagnostic procedures." 70  The reality of creating a
duplicate embryo, or clone, raises significant consent issues.
Must this fact be disclosed as part of the consent process? If so,
what is the appropriate cause of action for failure to disclose?
who indicated that he would not implant any embryos until the American Fertility
Society developed guidelines. Hall saw this as a means to increase the number of
embryos available for implantation and recommended PGD application at that time.
Id. at 652-53. Some hailed the possibility of a "twin-in-reserve ... for replacement
or spare parts." Jones et al., supra note 63, at 426. Others who have acknowledged
that cloning had been performed include: Lucinda Veeck, the director of embryology
at the Jones Institute for Reproductive Medicine in Norfolk, Va.; John Robertson, a
member of the American Fertility Society ("AFS") ethics committee; Margaret
Somerville, the director of the McGill Center for Medicine, Ethics, and Law in
Montreal; and Arthur Caplan, the president of the American Association of
Bioethics. See Kolberg, supra note 45, at 652-53 (labeling the separated blastomeres
as "test-tube twins"). The AFS became the American Society of Reproductive
Medicine ("ASRM"). See Luigi Mastroianni Jr., Risk Evaluation and Informed
Consent for Ovum Donation: A Clinical Perspective, 1 AM. J. BIOETHICS 28, 28 (Fall
2001). The AFS guidelines, which utilized the terminology "pre-embryo research"
instead of the term "cloning," condoned the research. See Kolberg, supra note 45, at
653.
.69 See Jones et al., supra note 63, at 426 (regarding the practice of separation at
the four-cell stage: "It was this type of cloning usually referred to as blastomere
separation, which caused the ethical hullabaloo by the prize paper [Hall's] at the
1993 Conjoint Annual Meeting of the American Fertility Society and the Canadian
Fertility and Andrology Society in Montreal."); see also Kolberg, supra 45, at 652-
53. Interestingly, while the NIH Human Embryo Research Panel recognized that
cloning resulted from blastomere separation, it attempted to separate it from the
PGD process. The Panel concluded that federal funding could not be provided for the
"[c]loning of human preimplantation embryos by separating blastomeres" nor for
"preimplantation genetic diagnosis for sex selection, except for sex-linked genetic
diseases." Human Embryo Research Panel Report, in CLONING AND THE FUTURE OF
HUMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH 251, 263 (Paul Lauritzen ed., 2001). By inference, the
Panel recognized the cloning, but wished to reserve the word "cloning" to represent
only reproductive cloning.
70 de Wert, supra note 11, at 650.
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II. CONSENT
A. Liability for the Breach of a Duty to Inform
Except for a few states, failure to disclose information
relating to a medical treatment decision generally falls within
the scope of a negligence action. 71 Under a negligence theory, a
client would have to prove that a biopsy practitioner breached a
duty to inform, premised upon what a reasonable practitioner
would disclose-or what a reasonable client would want to
know-depending on the jurisdictional standard. 72  Even if a
breach were proven, a clinician would have a potential defense
based on a therapeutic exception. A privilege to withhold
information exists where "full disclosure would be detrimental to
a patient's total care and best interests."73 If a negligence theory
were applied, the therapeutic exception could theoretically
release all clinicians from liability, premised on a concession that
knowledge about blastomere clone production-and subsequent
destruction-would be emotionally detrimental. Thus, the
principle elements of a negligence action would be difficult to
establish. Further, even if this hurdle could be surmounted, a
negligence plaintiff may have difficulty proving what damage
had been caused by the non-disclosure.
Perhaps a more successful avenue under a negligence theory
would be to allege that disclosure was necessary to avoid a
clinician's clouded judgment because of a self-interest 74 in
promoting PGD. The self-interest relates, in part, to the manner
in which PGD and other IVF technologies are regulated. Unlike
other medical technologies, which are generally subjected to
rigorous safety and effectiveness testing,75  the assisted
reproductive technologies ("ART') have quickly and quietly
71 See RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF
INFORMED CONSENT 28-38 (1986); JOHN H. ROBINSON ET AL., A HEALTH LAW
READER: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 241 (1999).
72 See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786 (D.C. Cir 1972)
(distinguishing professional rule from patient rule); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 7-8
(Cal. 1972); Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 556-58 (Okla. 1979).
73 Scott, 606 P.2d at 558. Other exceptions include cases of emergency and
cases where the patient knew or should have known the undisclosed fact. Id.
74 See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 793 P.2d 479, 483-84 (Cal.
1990) (demonstrating that the defendant's professional judgment was clouded by
undisclosed research interests).
75 Noah, supra note 8, at 617-18.
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marked their presence 76 absent those rigors.7 7 Instead, the IVF
industry presents more of a commercial face than a medical
one, 78 and is relatively self-regulatory. 79  The sole federal
regulation is the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification
Act of 1992.80 The Act imposes few requirements on ART clinics,
but does require the submission of an annual report on its
pregnancy success rate.81 PGD may increase the IVF pregnancy
success rate for chromosomally at-risk couples, since many
76 Bonnicksen, supra note 10, at 418; M. Alexander Otto, Medical Research:
Bioethics Panel Urges Federal Regulation of In Vitro, Other Reproduction
Technologies, 12 HEALTH L. REP. 1192, 1193 (2003) ("With no regulation, 'novel
technology moves from the experimental context to clinical practice with very little
oversight or deliberation.... Use becomes widespread rapidly."' (quoting a working
paper released by the President's Council on Bioethics)); Roberts, supra note 1, at 1
(stating that 1VF was introduced without a research phase).
77 Tasca & McClure, supra note 2, at 8.
78 See George J. Annas, The Shadowlands - Secrets, Lies, and Assisted
Reproduction, 339 NEw ENG. J. MED. 935, 938 (1998). Unlike other medical
procedures, which offer treatment for illness, PGD is marketed as a service to
potential clients. See Bonnicksen, supra note 10, at 411-12. Additionally, it differs
from other medical interventions (including prenatal testing) because clinics
performing PGD enjoy the full financial benefits of its use. The PGD clinic retains
control, performs the tests, and receives the profit. Id. at 409, 419.
79 Noah, supra note 8, at 618; Norton, supra note 11, at 1614. According to
some, the scope of what may be done is limited only be money. Lori B. Andrews &
Nanette Elster, Regulating Reproductive Technologies, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 35, 45
(2000).
80 Pub. L. No. 102-493, 106 Stat. 3146 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
263a-l-a-7). Government has mostly avoided ART issues, taking a minimalist
approach. ANDREA L. BONNICKSEN, CRAFTING A CLONING POLICY: FROM DOLLY TO
STEM CELLS 182 (2002).
81 42 U.S.C. § 263a-1 (2004). Each ART program must also identify the specific
embryology labs used along with IVF certification status. Id. Section 263a-2(g)
authorizes inspection of IVF laboratories. Id. § 263a-2(g). Lastly, section 263a-2(a)
provides for, but does not require, certification. Id. § 263a-2(a). The Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, which is the reporting agency, has additional
requirements, including the reporting of complications related to ART treatment.
Reporting of Pregnancy Success Rates From Assisted Reproductive Technology
Programs, 65 Fed. Reg. 53,310 (Sept. 1, 2000).
All laboratories must also be certified under the Clinical Laboratories
Improvement Amendments of 1988 ("CLIA") in order to examine biological
materials (including human embryos) for diagnostic or other purposes. 42 U.S.C. §
263a (a)-(b) (2004). Interestingly, while PGD offers diagnosis (including sex-typing)
based on the examination of a single cell, federal regulations authorized by CLIA
would seem to require more. The standard for cytogenetic clinics to make sex
determinations based upon X and Y chromatin counts is to examine an "adequate
number of cells." 42 C.F.R. § 493.1267 (a) (2002). Although the number is
indeterminate, the use of a plural suggests that the examination of more than one
cell is expected for accuracy.
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chromosomally damaged embryos do not implant.8 2 Thus, a
clinician may be tempted to encourage PGD to further the
pregnancy success rate, and to not disclose the production of
embryo clones, where the clinician feared rejection of the
procedure on that basis. A practitioner may not even be
consciously aware of the underlying self-interested motivations.
But, of course, that is the premise for an expanded use of the
informed consent doctrine-clouded judgment.8 3
The hazard becomes more apparent when analyzed in
conjunction with a principle that has dominated the medical
field from the beginning-beneficence.8 4  Beneficence is the
82 See Noah, supra note 8, at 627 (explaining that improved PGD techniques
screen out embryos unlikely to implant); see also Ladislava Jelinkova et al.,
Improved Implantation Rate After Chemical Removal of the Zona Pellucida, 79
FERTILITY & STERILITY 1299, 1299 (2003) (noting that "[t]he ability of an embryo to
develop and implant primarily relates to the quality of originating gametes and
intrinsic characteristics of the embryo."). Pre-selecting chromosomally normal
embryos increases the "take home" baby rate. Bonnicksen, supra note 10, at 412-13.
On the whole, however, statistics may suggest that PGD take-home baby rates fare
lower than IVF generally. See Burns, supra note 62, 102 (tying statistics to embryos
produced in comparison to babies born rather than implanted embryos in
comparison to babies).
83 See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 793 P.2d 479, 485-86 (Cal.
1990) (demonstrating that professional judgment was clouded by undisclosed
research interests). The tendency to overreach is part of our human nature; that is.
precisely the reason consent is needed. See James F. Childress, Protestant
Perspectives on Informed Consent (Particularly in Research Involving Human
Participants), 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 187, 201 (2002). Some clinicians subject
women to experiments and to increased dangers surreptitiously to improve clinical
success statistics. ANDREWS, supra note 53, at 48-49, 53-54.
84 Jay Katz, Informed Consent-Must It Remain a Fairy Tale?, 10 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & PoLy 69, 73 (1993). Beneficence is the underlying principle that
would allow a physician to make a decision on behalf of and for the benefit of his or
her patient. Id. However, as values differ between a physician and patient, the
patient is the one who should really be making the choice. Id. at 76-86.
PGD has the potential to not only benefit the deciding couple but also to result
in a broader accrued benefit in the form of reducing the occurrence of genetic
disease. Roberts, supra note 1, at 9. Therefore, practitioners are motivated to
suggest PGD because of their desire to prevent the birth of children with genetic
disorders. Bonnicksen, supra note 10, at 408.
Practitioners' orientation toward eliminating disease may influence their
presentation. "What is offered as objective clinical reality is often the subjectivity of
a devout disciple of the philosophy that death is an implacable enemy." Katz, supra
note 84, at 87 (citing SHERWIN B. NULAND, How WE DIE 258 (Knopf 1994)) ("He
dispenses only as much information as he deems fit, thereby influencing a patient's
decision-making in ways he does not recognize as self-serving."). Thus, because the
clinician's values may differ remarkably from the client, it is imperative that all the
issues are disclosed so that the individual (or couple) can evaluate all the facts in
accord with their personal views. If pieces of factual information are missing, the
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residual view that a physician knows what is best for his or her
patient.8 5 Because of this genuine interest in improving the
physical well-being of a client, a practitioner may be motivated
to apply the most advanced technology. PGD technology, which
becomes more routine with each application, may improve the
chances of successful IVF pregnancy for an at-risk couple.
8 6
Therefore, in the absence of federal regulation,8 7 there may be an
incentive to encourage PGD based on a perceived benefit to the
couple. Its use could also benefit the clinician, as statistics could
potentially translate into better reporting data, if the at-risk
couple utilizes PGD in addition to IVF to achieve pregnancy, and
thereby provide fodder for clinical advertising. Further,
recommending use of the most advanced technology protects
practitioners against liability.88
This suggests that a clinician who is protected from liability
based on the therapeutic privilege has a potential to manipulate
a decision regarding the use of PGD, and thereby seriously
interfere with a client's autonomous choice concerning the
procedure.8 9 Even if a claimant could prove clouded judgment
decision will be imbalanced and more likely to correspond with the clinician's views
on the moral status of the blastomere clone and the appropriate lines to be drawn
regarding its laboratory production and use.
85 See Joel N. Ephross, In Vitro Fertilization: Perspectives on Current Issues, 32
JURIMETRICS J. 447, 453-54 (1992).
86 See Tomas Escudero et al., Predictive Value of Sperm Fluorescence In Situ
Hybridization Analysis on the Outcome of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis for
Translocations, 79 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1528, 1532 (2003) (stating that the
success rate was relatively high-sixty percent-when the transferred embryos
were morphologically and developmentally normal). Nevertheless, overall, the
success rate for PGD is still low. See Helen M. Alvare, Catholic Teaching and the
Law Concerning the New Reproductive Technologies, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 107,
115 (2002); Kanavakis & Traeger-Synodinos, supra note 6, at 6.
87 The absence of laws prohibiting or regulating PGD may symbolically
represent acceptance. See Kaveny, supra note 3, at 33-34. Thus, a perception of
beneficence is not restricted either legally or by a forced recognition of conflicting
moral views.
88 See Michael J. Malinowski, Coming Into Being: Law, Ethics, and the Practice
of Prenatal Genetic Screening, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1435, 1506-07 (1994); Julia Walsh,
Reproductive Rights and the Human Genome Project, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S
STUD. 145, 173 (1994); see also Botkin, supra note 32, at 283 (discussing malpractice
in the prenatal context). If older women must be counseled about their increased
risk of conceiving a genetically abnormal child, then it will be only a matter of time
before PGD must also be suggested or recommended.
89 See FADEN & BEAUcHAMP, supra note 71, at 364. There has been concern
about physician abuse of the "therapeutic" exception where information is withheld
not only "to avert significant harm to patients but as a convenient means of
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and self-interest, a clinician may counter that the undisclosed
facts relate solely to the motives to encourage the use of the most
advanced technology. Thus, the fact of blastomere clone
production could potentially remain undisclosed. And, of course,
a plaintiff would still have to overcome the obstacle of proving
damages. Thus, a negligence argument is likely to be
unsuccessful.
B. The Development of the Informed Consent Theory
1. The Birth in Battery
Negligence is not the only recourse for complaints about
inadequate disclosures. The four cases generally credited with
acknowledging the importance of informational disclosures in
the context of medical intervention and providing the backdrop
to informed consent are all grounded in battery:90 Schloendorff
v. Society of The New York Hospital,91 Mohr v. Williams,92 Pratt
v. Davis,93 and Rolater v. Strain94 all deal with information
passed between physician and patient and the physicians'
inadequate disclosures. 95 In Schloendorff, the patient consented
to an abdominal examination under anesthesia, but not to an
operation. The physician's removal of a fibroid tumor was found
to have exceeded the scope of consent. 96 In Mohr, the plaintiff
consented to surgery on the right ear. Once the patient was
anesthetized, however, the physician performed a full
manipulating patients into consenting to their recommendations." Id. (citing
Charles W. Lidz & Alan Meisel, Informed Consent and the Structure of Medical
Care, in 2 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS (1983)); see
also Alan Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a
Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 WIs. L. REV
413, 461 (1979).
90 See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 71, at 120-23.
91 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914) (opinion by Cardozo, J.).
92 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905).
93 79 N.E. 562, 563-64 (Ill. 1906). In this case, the physician performed a
hysterectomy on an epileptic without consent. Id. The court rejected the argument
that the epileptic condition rendered the patient incompetent to decide. Id. at 564.
94 137 P. 96 (Okla. 1913).
95 See Pratt, 79 N.E. at 564; Mohr, 104 N.W. at 13; Schloendorff, 211 N.Y. at
128, 105 N.E. at 93; Rolater, 137 P. at 97.
96 Schloendorff, 211 N.Y. at 131-32, 105 N.E. at 94. The plaintiff lost the case
because his case focused on the hospital's liability rather than the physician's, and
the hospital had not violated the patient's informed consent. Id. at 131, 135, 105
N.E. at 94-95.
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examination of her left ear.97 Determining that the left ear was
more damaged, he performed a surgical procedure on the left ear
instead of the right one that had been the subject of the
consent. 98 Liability was premised on lack of consent because the
wrong body part had been touched.99 In Pratt, the physician
believed his patient was incompetent to make proper
decisions. 100  Therefore, he knowingly provided deceptive
information, inducing the patient's consent to a treatment that
ultimately resulted in a hysterectomy. 10 1 In Rolater, the patient
consented to having her foot drained, but not to the removal of
any bones.102 The court held the physician liable for removing
her bone because he performed the operation in a manner
substantially different from the agreed-upon intervention.'
0 3
In each of the above cases, the actions for injuries based on a
lack of informed consent originated in battery because of the
dignitary interest at stake. This interest is deeply rooted in the
principle of autonomy, 0 4 the right to self-determination, and
bodily integrity. 10 5 The right to make autonomous decisions
regarding one's body is considered so important that
unauthorized touching will result in liability, even if an
97 Mohr, 104 N.W. at 13.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Pratt, 79 N.E. at 563- 64.
101 Id. at 563.
102 Rolater v. Strain,137 P. 96, 97 (Okla. 1913).
103 Id.
104 JOHN H. ROBINSON ET AL., A HEALTH LAW READER: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
APPROACH 239 (1999). Informed consent and autonomy both preserve human
dignity, seek to equalize the inequalities between professional and client, and
diminish "medical dehumanization." Id. See also FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note
71, at 25. Prof. Sulmasy further distinguishes autonomous choices, which are
reflected in the secular model of informed consent, and autonomous persons, defined
by the natural law model to be not free to make wrong moral choices. Daniel P.
Sulmassy, Informed Consent Without Autonomy, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 207, 207-
12 (2002). This point provides support to a growing concern that individuals not
make reproductive choices independent of social consideration.
105 See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The
court concluded that the inadequate disclosure issue was appropriate for a battery
cause of action: "uninformed consent to an operation does not confer the necessary
authority." Id. at 793; see also Schloendorff v. Soc'y of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125,
129,105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914) ("Every human being of adult years and sound mind has
a right to determine what shall be done with his own body."). See also Ken Marcus
Gatter, Protecting Patient-Doctor Discourse: Informed Consent and Deliberative
Autonomy, 78 OR. L. REV. 941, 946-53 (1999) (discussing negligence and battery in
the context of informed consent).
2005]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
intervention is beneficial. 106 So why, in protecting this right, has
there been a shift from battery to negligence?
2. The Drift Towards Negligence
Salgo v. Leland Stanford Junior University Board of
Trustees10 7 was one of the early disclosure cases and has been
attributed with linking the two concepts of "informed" and
"consent."'08 The court's conclusion that a plaintiff could recover
based on a physician's duty to disclose "any facts which are
necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the
patient to the proposed treatment"'1 9  coincided with the
publication of an influential article by the noted legal scholar
Allan McCoid. 1" 0 McCoid proposed that all physician misconduct
should find remedy in negligence"' for "reasons of consistency"
and historical good faith beneficence on the part of physicians. 112
The article had significant impact on courts, influencing them to
reject battery and instead adopt a negligence framework in the
context of consent to medical interventions.113
106 FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 71, at 28, 123; see, e.g., Clayton v. New
Dreamland Roller Skating Rink, Inc., 82 A.2d 458, 459 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1951), cert. denied, 100 A.2d 567 (1953) (where a skating rink attendant attempted
to set patron's broken arm for her physical well-being amidst her protests).
107 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (addressing a physician who
failed to inform the patient of the risks of a new procedure that left him paralyzed).
108 FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 71, at 125-26. The doctrine itself "reflects
an ethical shift away from professional paternalism [beneficence] ... and toward
individual autonomy." Scott, supra note 39, at 266. The shift reflects a social
consensus that the principle of respect for autonomy trumps beneficence. Id.
109 Salgo, 317 P.2d at 181.
110 FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 71, at 127-28.
111 See generally Allan H. McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized
Medical Treatment, 41 MINN. L. REV. 381, 434 (1957).
112 FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 71, at 127 (referencing McCoid, supra
note 111). A vestige of this attitude continues as the government continues to defer
to the judgment of medical professionals, even to the extent of not regulating
anything perceived to interfere with a doctor's autonomy. See BONNICKSEN, supra
note 80, at 111 (an intervention defined as a "practice of medicine," is without FDA
oversight). Now the FDA has limited jurisdiction over a few fertility-related
procedures, such as ooplasm transplantation between eggs, based on grounds that
biologic "products" are created. But FDA oversight does not review ethical issues; its
jurisdiction extends only to safety and efficacy. Parens & Knowles, supra note 6, at
S6.
113 FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 71, at 128. A few jurisdictions-
Pennsylvania, for example-retained the medical battery actions. See JESSICA W.
BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 54 (2d
ed. 2001).
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Two additional circumstances influenced the new judicial
attitudes. Technological advances resulted in increased
availability of treatment alternatives. 114 Additionally, publicity
about Nazi atrocities and American abuses in human subject
research undermined trust in the profession. 1 5 As a result, a
cultural acceptance of physician beneficence shifted to an
emphasis on patient autonomy, not just from unwanted
touching, but with respect to medical decision-making as a
whole.' 1 6  To make the important decisions intelligently,
physicians were charged with a duty to provide information
material to the decision, thereby affording patients a reasonable
means of self-protection." 7
To a large extent, the shift to a negligence analysis made
sense. Pragmatically, battery actions often too narrowly
constrained plaintiffs. Negligence, on the other hand, appeared
more flexible and also provided plaintiffs a longer statute of
limitations." 8 Application of a negligence theory was also an
advantage to practitioners, allowing them to avoid the undue
demands of second guessing patients' individual perspectives
regarding informational needs." 9 Liability in negligence for
inadequate disclosure 120 also seemed a fairer approach when,
114 See Bassett, supra note 9, at 500; Sandra Anderson Garcia, Sociocultural
and Legal Implications of Creating and Sustaining Life Through Biomedical
Technology, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 469, 469 (1996).
115 See David Dickson, Europe Split on Embryo Research, 242 SCIENCE 1117,
1117 (1988) (addressing the outrage over Nazi experiments which lead to laws
forbidding harmful experiments on human embryos); Larry I. Palmer, Disease
Management and Liability in the Human Genome Era, 47 VILL. L. REV. 1, 28-31
(2002) (discussing abuses within the United States).
116 BERG ETAL., supra note 113, at 20.
117 Id.
118 See Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 121, 139
(2001).
119 See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(concluding that a "reasonable patient" perspective resolves the materiality issue in
favor of individuals while not subjecting physicians to unreasonable whims of which
they could not have been aware). The court concluded that the inadequate
disclosure issue was appropriate for a battery cause of action: "uninformed consent
to an operation does not confer the necessary authority." Id. at 793. Nevertheless,
the court held the defendant liable in negligence because the one-year statute of
limitations would have defeated the battery action. Id.
120 VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 98-99
(10th ed. 2000) (discussing how the doctrine of informed consent generally concerns
the disclosure of risks related to a proposed medical intervention); see also BERG ET
AL., supra note 113, at 55-60. The risks can be further broken down to including
disclosures relating to: "(1) the nature of the risk, (2) the magnitude of the risk, (3)
2005]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
although the physician had performed the treatment properly,
he had failed to address the collateral issues of associated
risks. 121 The negligence route also provided additional benefits,
including the availability of added defenses, 122 the requirement
of harm caused by the lack of disclosure, 123 and a decreased
exposure to punitive damages. 124
The application of negligence law to evaluate physician
conduct regarding disclosure of treatment risks melds well with
the basic principles of negligence, which are all about balancing
risks and burdens.1 25  However, by exclusively focusing on
negligence and its corresponding concentration on liability
reduction, we risk losing sight of the underlying principle of
autonomy and its corresponding collaborative decision-making
process.1 26  In short, a lingering tension between the legal
rationale and its underlying basis persists. 127 Thus, despite a
the probability that the risk might materialize, and (4) the imminence of risk
materialization" Id. at 56; DOBBS, supra note 56, at 654. The elements of a claim for
lack of informed consent are:
(1) nondisclosure of required information; (2) actual damage such as loss of
a leg; (3) resulting from the risks of which the patient was not informed; (4)
cause in fact, which is to say that the plaintiff would have rejected the
medical treatment if she had known the risk; and (5) that reasonable
persons, if properly informed, would have rejected the proposed treatment.
DOBBS, supra note 56, at 654. (emphasis added).
121 See, e.g., Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (Kan. 1960) (finding that
the doctor's failure to inform patient of side-effects associated with a mastectomy
was negligent because these risks were foreseeable); see also Nelson v. Patrick, 293
S.E.2d 829, 831 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that a lack of information logically
leads to an action in negligence, not battery, because battery actions are limited by
a one year statute of limitations); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676, 686 (R.I. 1972)
(finding that a lack of disclosure related to treatment-associated risks of radiation
treatment sounded in negligence).
122 Katz, supra note 84, at 78.
123 See DOBBS, supra note 56, at 654.
124 Alexander Morgan Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease
Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340, 418 (1974).
125 See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.
1947); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, 169-
73 (5th ed. 1984).
126 John Lantos, Informed Consent: The Whole Truth for Patients?, 72 CANCER
2811 (1993), in A HEALTH LAW READER: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 250,
252-53 (John H. Robinson et al. eds., 1999). Ethicist Alexander Capron considered
battery as closer to the spirit of the doctrine. Capron, supra note 124, at 418-20. A
focus on collaboration in the decision-making process reflects that autonomy may
net be "perfect." Instead, it is "deliberative." See Gatter, supra note 105, at 961. To
be deliberative while respecting a decision-maker's autonomy suggests that
material information must be brought to the table for discussion.
127 See Katz, supra note 84, 77-81; see also Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d. 772
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trend toward negligence, actions in battery are still viable. 128 In
an industry lacking regulations and the consequent imposition of
a standard of care, a battery action may be a more appropriate
cause of action. 129
3. The Availability of Both Battery and Negligence
The plaintiff in a battery action-at least since the drift
toward a negligence analysis-would be charged with the
difficult task of persuading a court that the decision-maker was
deprived of more than collateral information relating to
treatment-related risks. To succeed, the non-disclosure must
have been tantamount to a plaintiffs substantial mistake about
the nature or character of the medical intervention. 130 The
slippery distinction between the plaintiffs ignorance of risk,
suggesting negligence, and her mistake about the nature of the
operation,1 31 suggesting battery, requires proving more than a
lack of informed consent; consent itself must be negated. 1
32
C. Negated Consent and Battery
One way of determining whether consent is negated is by
examining the context of the touch. When circumstances related
to the touch transform an otherwise authorized touch to one that
is offensive, consent is negated by the existence of those known,
but undisclosed, facts.1 33 For example, consent to sex may be
vitiated by a material mistake about the person who delivers the
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (employing a schizophrenic approach, which recognizes autonomy,
but ultimately favors objectification of the decision-making process); Scott v.
Bradford 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979).
128 DOBBS, supra note 56, at 232. The classic case is where there had been no
authorization at all. See, e.g., Vitale v. Henchey, 24 S.W.3d 651 (Ky. 2000) (holding
that lack of authorization to perform a surgery resulted in battery liability). Courts
specifically affirm that negligence based on lack of informed consent has not
"supplanted" battery actions even where there has been some manifestation of
consent. Id. at 657; Kus v. Sherman Hosp., 644 N.E.2d 1214, 1220 (Ill. App. Ct.
1995) (stating that a claim for medical battery exists where treatment given was
"substantially at variance" from consented-to treatment).
129 See Palmer, supra note 115, at 31-32.
130 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B (1979); DOBBS, supra note 56, at
232; KEETON ET AL., supra note 125, at 114.
131 DOBBS, supra note 56, at 243.
132 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B (1979); DOBBS, supra note 56, at
232 (2000); KEE
TON ET AL., supra note 125, at 118-19.
133 KEETON ET AL., supra 125, at 119-20.
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touch. If the plaintiff were a victim of a mock marriage, for
instance, a defense of consent to the sexual touching is
ineffective. 34 Consent is also negated when induced by deceit 135
or by a mistake as to the necessity of the touch. 136 Additionally,
a battery action for lack of consent is viable for medical
interventions applied to the wrong body part 37 or for wrong
interventions applied to a correct body part.138 In each instance,
the context of the touch is considered sufficiently serious so as to
be material in defining its character. In such instances, a
134 Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434 (1868). In a medical context, consent to
surgery may be negated in some jurisdictions if performance may be impaired by a
surgeon's undisclosed condition. See, e.g., Hawk v. Chattanooga Orthopaedic Group,
45 S.W.3d 24 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (finding that failure to disclose physician's
disabling hand condition was material to the decision to undergo hip replacement
surgery).
135 See, e.g., Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 426-27 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983) (stating that consent to intercourse may be vitiated by lack of consent to
resultant pregnancy). The defendant had told plaintiff that he was unable to
impregnate her and thereby induced her consent to intercourse. Id. Thus, the
plaintiff did not consent to the nature of the touching because she did not have
knowledge of its true nature and possible consequences. See id; see also Hobbs v.
Kizer, 236 F. 681 (8th Cir. 1916). In Hobbs, the defendant physician impregnated
his patient. Id. Then, when she complained of a pregnancy, the physician said the
symptoms were instead caused by an abscess. Id. Plaintiff consented to surgery
whereby an abortion that was represented to be another operation was performed to
the detriment of the patient. Id. at 682.
136 See, e.g., Rains v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 249, 251-53 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984) (holding that consent to physical therapy was vitiated due to lack of
necessity); Clair v. Reprod. Health Servs., 720 S.W.2d 793, 794-95 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986) (involving a plaintiff who consented to an unneeded abortion because
negligently performed tests indicated that she was pregnant); Bartell v. State, 82
N.W. 142, 143 (Wis. 1900) (holding that consent to a physician's liberal touching is
negated if the patient is unaware that the touching was medically unnecessary). For
instance, in Cacdac v. West, the plaintiff was advised that she faced a risk of
paralysis possibly just by stepping off a curb if she did not undergo back surgery.
705 N.E.2d 506, 509, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). This potentially constituted
fraudulent inducement, which also vitiates consent.
137 Barrette v. Lopez, 725 N.E.2d 314, 316 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (permitting the
plaintiff to pursue her claim in battery for unauthorized removal of part of stomach
during corrective surgery on small intestine). This line of cases resembles the classic
case of Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905).
138 See, e.g., Bey v. Sacks, 789 A.2d 232, 235, 240 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (holding
that consent was given only for surgical extraction rather than the simple extraction
that was actually performed); see also Hobbs, 236 F. at 682 (finding consent to
remove abscess but not to perform an abortion); Blanchard v. Kellum, 975 S.W.2d
522, 524-25 (Tenn. 1998) (discussing a case where plaintiff consented to the
removal of all thirty-two of her teeth, but not a procedure that removed them all
during a single visit).
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plaintiffs lack of contextual awareness renders any consent
ineffective.
In each of the preceding examples, withholding material
facts thwarted intelligent decision-making. The undisclosed
facts concerned more than mere collateral matters; they related
to "a major feature of the transaction."' 139 Notwithstanding the
general rule that undisclosed risks are generally treated as
collateral matters to be resolved under negligence rules, there
are three categories of circumstances where undisclosed risks
could be considered a major feature of the transaction and
thereby change the nature of the touching.
The first category concerns medical interventions whose
experimental nature has not been disclosed. 140 When a person
consents to medical treatment, it is with the knowledge that
certain known and reasonable risks may be encountered during
treatment. With experimental procedures, however, the risks
are unknown. Therefore, if a patient has consented to a
particular medical intervention and has not been made aware of
its experimental nature, the intervention may be considered a
substantial variance from the treatment for which consent had
been given. 14' This renders the recipient of the treatment
ignorant as to the nature of the procedure. 142 The resultant
battery action can co-exist with a separate action in
negligence. 143 While the negligence action deals with foreseeable
risks of an agreed upon procedure, the battery action's viability
rests instead upon a consideration that the facts "did not mean
139 DOBBS, supra note 56, at 232; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
892B (1979); KEETON ET AL., supra note 125, at 119.
140 See, e.g., Gaston v. Hunter, 588 P.2d 326, 331, 352 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978)
(permitting case to go to the jury on the issue of some committed errors by
defendant doctors); Kus v. Sherman Hosp., 644 N.E.2d 1214, 1217, 1220 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1995) (finding that a hospital and physician may be held liable for the
undisclosed experimental nature of the intraocular lenses used in the procedure);
Shadrick v. Coker, 963 S.W.2d 726, 729-30 (Tenn. 1998) (discussing the
experimental nature of pedicile screws inserted during back surgery). A battery-
based theory is useful in the experimental or research context because information
is not just about informing a patient of foreseeable risks, it also allows the subject to
determine whether to participate at all. Palmer, supra note 115, at 27.
141 See Kus, 644 N.E.2d at 1220-21.
142 Gaston, 588 P.2d at 350-51.
143 Shadrick, 963 S.W.2d at 731-32 (discussing a health care provider's failure
to disclose known risks associated with the particular treatment and the subsequent
tort liability).
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anything" to the patient until he learned of their experimental
nature. 144
The second risk category is based on a calculation that the
withheld facts expose the unknowing recipient to a known high
risk of serious harm. A familiar example renders consent to
sexual intercourse ineffective if a party, with knowledge of their
condition, did not disclose that he or she had a sexually
transmittable condition. 145 While the pleasurable purpose of the
touching was satisfied, the additional known consequence-
exposure to a sexually transmitted disease-was improperly
withheld. The same probabilistic standard may be applied in the
medical context. In one exemplary case, a physician failed to
warn a patient that a proposed bi-lateral thyroidectomy would
expose her to a serious threat of vocal chord paralysis. 146 The
undisclosed risk was considered an essential feature of the
procedure, rather than a mere collateral matter, because of the
elevated probabilities in conjunction with the seriousness of the
consequences. Denying the patient information about such facts
that are material to the decision denied her the right to
autonomous decision-making and bodily integrity. 147 Thus,
despite the general rule that a lack of informed consent may
generally be regarded as negligence, when undisclosed potential
risks rise to the level of a high likelihood of serious harm, mere
negligence rules do not apply. Instead, consent is considered
ineffective, and not merely uninformed.
Finally, consent is not effective if a known material
consequence that is certain to occur has not been disclosed. 148
Two examples provide illustration. In Bang v. Charles T. Miller
Hospital, the physician determined that the patient's bladder
complaint related to a prostate gland problem. 149 Following the
144 Id. at 734 (experimental pedicile screw installation during back surgery).
145 See, e.g., Leleux v. United States, 178 F.3d 750, 754- 55 (5th Cir. 1999)
(accepting the standard that fraudulent concealment of venereal disease during
consensual sex constitutes a battery); Doe v. Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382, 1389, 1391
(W.D. Mich. 1993) (finding a battery where defendant was infected with the HIV
virus, had AIDS's associated symptoms, or knew a prior sex partner had been
diagnosed); Hogan v. Tavzel, 660 So. 2d 350, 353 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (finding
the consent given without any knowledge of possible exposure to STD was
equivalent to giving no consent at all).
146 See Congrove v. Holmes, 308 N.E.2d 765, 767 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. 1973).
147 Id. at 770.
148 KEETON ETAL., supra note 125, at 120.
149 88 N.W.2d 186, 187 (Minn. 1958).
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patient's consent to a transurethral prostate resection to cure the
bladder trouble, the physician successfully performed the
surgery. 150 A routine part of the procedure included severing the
spermatic cords, thereby rendering the patient sterile. 151
Because of its seriousness, the consequence of sterility should
have been disclosed, to give the patient the opportunity to make
an intelligent decision about whether to undergo the
treatment. 152  In Montgomery v. Bazaz-Sehgal, the material
consequence was the routine insertion of a penile implant during
a revascularization procedure.1 53  The procedure's certain
association with penile implantation required disclosure of that
fact in order for the patient to have a true understanding of the
nature of the operation.154 The undisclosed facts did not affect
the cures sought, which were achieved in both cases.
1 55
Nevertheless, the undisclosed facts were an essential feature of
the procedure because they were a consistent consequence of the
touching. It can also be inferred that the certain consequence
was of sufficient import to be material to the choice regarding
whether to undergo the treatment. 156
III. BATTERY APPLIED TO PGD
A. Cloning As Essential to Its Nature
The application of battery to PGD based on ineffective
consent most resembles the last category addressed above. 57 In
PGD, the diagnostic purpose associated with severing the
blastomere is met, but an additional certain consequence has not
been revealed. This situation contrasts sharply with negligence
actions premised on a lack of informed consent. Unlike the
circumstance in negligence actions, which protect physicians
from unfair liability for medical judgments regarding the
probable risks that one might encounter, the certain consequence
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 190.
153 798 A.2d 742, 747 (Pa. 2002).
154 Id. at 748.
155 See Bang, 88 N.W.2d at 188 (noting that surgery was done to correct bladder
problems); Montgomery, 798 A.2d at 744-46 (commenting on the procedure
performed corrected plaintiffs impotence).
156 See Montgomery, 798 A.2d at 748.
157 See supra notes 133-57 and accompanying text.
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of blastomere clone production involves no medical evaluation of
risks. Since the practitioner-known 158 consequence of cloning is
routine to the procedure of embryo biopsy, it constitutes part of
its essential nature. 15 9 Because the undisclosed fact details an
essential feature rather than a mere collateral risk associated
with the touching, consent is nullified rather than uninformed,
provided that the undisclosed information is material to the
decision. 160 Therefore, a client's right to bodily integrity is more
appropriately addressed in battery.
Having concluded that issues of consent to embryo biopsy
should be analyzed in battery, we must next determine whether
the failure to reveal this essential clone-producing nature of the
process would be material to a decision to authorize PGD.161
B. Cloning as Material to the Decision
Information is material if its sufficient importance could
cause one to decide differently.1 62 Two arguments could be
advanced in concluding that the consequential creation (and
destruction) of a blastomere clone during embryo biopsy is not
material to the decision. The first concentrates on the clinician.
A biopsy practitioner's reluctance to divulge the significance of
the severed totipotent blastomere may result from the current
158 It would also have to be known by the clinician. See KEETON ET AL., supra
note 125, at 232. This is easily satisfied by the direct statements found in a medical
textbook. See, e.g., de Wert, supra note 11, at 650.
159 See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text (describing how blastomere
clone creation is a natural result of embryo biopsy).
160 DOBBS, supra note 56, § 100 (stating that, unlike collateral risks, material
risks are sufficient to vitiate consent).
161 Id.
162 Mary Z. Pelias & Nathan J. Markward, The Human Genome Project and
Public Perception: Truth and Consequences, 49 EMORY L.J. 837, 842 (2000) (citing
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786-87 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). Materiality is based
on a subjective view of what is important to consider or know about the procedure.
Causation itself is separate. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 71, at 303-04; see
also Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 557-58 (Okla. 1980) (dealing with informed
consent).
Adrienne Asch contends that couples who are provided prenatal diagnostic
information should also be provided with educational information about the
diseases for which the results were positive, thereby mitigating the negativity. By
offering the information, the choice will be more informed. See Botkin, supra note
32, at 285; Benjamin Wilfond, Newborn Screening and Carrier Detection for Cystic
Fibrosis: Complementary or Contradictory?, 29 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 30 (Supp.
2001). By analogy, a couple thinking about utilizing PGD should be informed about
the creation of the blastomere clone in addition.
[Vol.79:13
INVOLUNTARY CLONING: A BATTERY
widespread disapproval of reproductive cloning.163  PGD
clinicians who have no interest in reproductive cloning may not
be focused on the potentiality for life in the separated
blastomere. To them, the creation of a blastomere clone as a
result of its totipotency could be considered not material because
its reproductive potential is not critical to its purpose. The effect
of the diagnostic objective is not growth, but cessation of
development.
The second argument, which assumes that a reasonable
PGD client would decide in favor of embryo biopsy even if the
generation of blastomere clones were known, flows naturally
from the first. In support of the assumption, it could be noted
that the ultimate purpose of improving the chances of producing
genetically related children that do not suffer from defined
abnormalities has been met. Additionally, the couple has
already agreed to produce several embryos knowing that there is
little likelihood that all will survive. Therefore, any subsequent
production (and destruction) of blastomere clones to aid in the
selection process would presumably be of little import to the
decision to authorize the procedure. One could argue that
consent may be inferred based on the following: a reasonable
person in the position of one who is deciding to utilize PGD in
conjunction with IVF would consent to embryo biopsy even if the
fact of blastomere clone creation had been disclosed.
The arguments are logically appealing. It is true that
neither party has the intent of reproductive life in the context of
preimplantation diagnosis. It is also true that the client has
consented to the production of potential life with knowledge of
the risks that some of the embryos will not be permitted to
survive. 164 When taken together, the arguments suggest that
163 See, e.g., Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2003, H.R. 534, 108th Cong. §
301(a) (2003); Human Cloning Ban and Stem Cell Research Protection Act of 2003,
S. 303, 108th Cong. § 301(a)(1) (2003); Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2002,
107th Congress, S. 2439, § 301(a)(1) (2002); Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001,
S. 1899, 107th Cong. § 301(1) (2002) (passed by the House on July 31, 2001); Human
Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001, H.R. 2505, 107th Cong. § 301(1) (2001) (engrossed);
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 24185-24186 (Deering 2001). Each of these acts
prohibited reproductive cloning. See also Lori B. Andrews & Nanette Elster,
Regulating Reproductive Technologies, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 35, 43 (2000) (observing
an "overwhelming negative public response" to human cloning).
164 See infra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.
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the clients have already weighed and balanced both the
production of potential new life and its destruction.
Despite this logical appeal, both arguments have serious
flaws. At least one pretends that creation is not important
because destruction is certain. Both ignore any ethical concerns
over production separate from an intent to implant.
1. Intend/Foresee Distinction 165
Verbalizing consent to the production of IVF embryos
despite knowledge that those not needed for the couple's
reproductive purposes may be destroyed does not mean that the
commissioning couple has weighed and balanced all the facts
relevant to PGD. The couple has only balanced facts related to
the issue presented-the effect on the host embryo. 166  If the
explanation concerning the destruction of blastomeres during the
testing process does not include the clonal nature of those cells,
then the couple has not been presented with all the facts
necessary to perform the decisional balancing.
165 See generally FitzPatrick, supra note 27, at 29-30 (describing and labeling
the analysis the "intend/foresee distinction").
166 See, e.g., Inst. for Reprod. Med. and Sci. of Saint Barnabas, supra note 51.
The Institute for Reproductive Medicine and Science of Saint Barnabas, which
performs PGD, does discuss totipotency of blastomeres and its non-deleterious effect
on the embryo, but does not meaningfully address its significance to the severed
blastomere:
No part of the future fetus will be lacking because one or two cells are
removed from the embryo approximately two days after fertilization. All
the cells of the embryo remain totipotent until about the fourth day....
[E]ach cell by itself can grow into a whole and perfect fetus. The procedure
merely delays continued cell division for a few hours, after which the
embryo reaches the same number of cells as before and continues its
normal development.
Id. Without more information, intelligent people may not understand that the
severed blastomere also has the potential for development. I tested the effect of the
statement in my Torts class on Sept. 17, 2003. Sixty-three percent of my class did
not understand the significance of totipotency to the severed blastomere. See also
Burns, supra note 62, at 87; IntegraMed Am., supra note 62 (explaining process,
risks to embryo, formation of complete embryo despite cell removal, utilitarian
value of removed blastomeres). An article on counseling describes PGD as follows:
"one or two cells of an embryo created via IVF are biopsied and tested." Burns,
supra note 62, at 87. It then notes the beneficial avoidance of abortion as well as its
comparative success and accuracy rates. Id. But the only moral objections explained
to reproductive counselors related to the destructive nature on affected biopsied
embryos and the potential for abusive use based on parental preference. Id. The
counseling journal ignores any moral objection to the production of blastomere
clones or their subsequent destruction, thereby suggesting a gap in client-proffered
information.
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Evidence materializing from the stem cell debate
demonstrates why consenting to one does not authorize the
other. Some consider there to be a moral distinction between
permitting left-over IVF embryos to be used for stem cell
purposes, and producing the embryos for that purpose. 1
67
Similar to the application of PGD testing, extraction of stem cells
is biologically fatal. 168 Assuming arguendo that consent to the
production of blastomere clones may be inferred, one may not
further infer consent to their subsequent destruction during
diagnostic testing. This illustrates the difference between
results that are intended and those that are merely foreseeable.
When embryos are produced in order to harvest their stem
cells, all the plans and courses of action are focused on the goal
of procuring stem cells. It is known at the time of the decision to
produce those embryos that harvesting may be accomplished
only by resulting catastrophe to the host. 169 The decision thereby
corresponds to a legal definition of intent: when a person who
sets a force in motion knows with substantial certainty that a
particular consequence will come about, the result is intended. 70
In this case, the intended consequence is destruction of the
research embryo. Because blastomeres are produced knowing
167 Ryan, supra note 16, at 51; see also FitzPatrick, supra note 27, at 29; Gene
Outka, The Ethics of Stem Cell Research, Paper Presented to The President's
Council on Bioethics (April 2002), available at http://www.bioethics.govlbackgroundl
outkapaper.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2005) (application of the "nothing is lost
principle" notes that embryos already in existence would be destroyed anyway).
Notable public figures make the distinction between using embryos for research
that will not be implanted and creating them solely for research purposes.
FitzPatrick, supra note 27, at 29. Among these are Georgetown University professor
of medical ethics, Edmund Pellegrino, and past member of the Human Embryo
Research Panel, Patricia King, who considered fertilizing human ova just for
research "unnerving." WINGERSON, supra note 68, at 82-84. "The notion of creating
embryos solely for research, which will necessarily entail their destruction, is much
more controversial" than using IVF embryos that have already been created and
will die any way. Alexander Morgan Capron, Placing a Moratorium on Research
Cloning to Ensure Effective Control Over Reproductive Cloning, 53 HASTINGS L. J.
1057, 1058 (2002). Creating potential life knowing that it will be destroyed is
"ethically problematic" even if using pre-existing embryos may not be. James J.
McCartney, Embryonic Stem Cell Research and Respect for Human Life:
Philosophical and Legal Reflections, 65 ALB. L. REV. 597, 615-16 (2002).
168 See Makdisi, supra note 66, at 481.
169 See FitzPatrick, supra note 27, at 30 (stating that "an embryo is being
created with a view to its desctruction").
170 See, e.g., Joseph H. King, Jr., Defining the Internal Context for
Communications Containing Allegedly Defamatory Headline Language, 71 U. CIN.
L. REV. 863, 903 (2003).
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that they will be subject to diagnostic testing that results in
certain destruction, their destruction is likewise intended. 171
By contrast, destruction of unused embryos is not intended,
because the link between creation and destruction is far less
certain. During the IVF process that precedes embryo biopsy, a
couple typically commissions the production of several embryos
for reproductive purposes. Although only two or three are
generally expected to be simultaneously implanted, 172 many
more are usually produced. 173 Since the success rate for IVF is
so low, 174 some prefer ripening, harvesting, and fertilizing many
eggs at a time over having a woman repeat the risky, painful,
and expensive 75 hormone stimulation program and surgical
intervention. 76 How many of the embryos are left over depends
upon how soon successful pregnancy is achieved. Although
destruction of some may be reasonably anticipated, there is no
expectation that all will be destroyed. A reasonably anticipated
consequence is not considered intended, but foreseeable. 77
Based on this legitimate distinction between what is
intended and what is foreseeable, no justifiable conclusion may
be drawn that consent to the production of IVF embryos
impliedly authorizes the creation of blastomere clones.
2. Materiality Based on Other Factors
One could assert that blastomere clone production is not
material since current scientific technology is incapable of
171 See FitzPatrick, supra note 27, at 30 (describing and labeling the analysis
the "intend/foresee distinction").
172 See Ephross, supra note 85, at 457-58 (stating that any more than three
poses a high risk to the woman).
173 Cynthia B. Cohen, Protestant Perspectives on the Uses of the New
Reproductive Technologies, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 135, 144-45 (2002) (stating that
Protestants agree that respect is owed early embryos, but do not agree on when they
become discrete individuals or the extent to which ART may be utilized).
174 Norton, supra note 11, at 1596; see also Hossam E. Fadel, The Islamic
Viewpoint on New Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 147,
152 (2002) (comparing fertilization to live birth).
175 Robertson, supra note 9, at 452 n.123. In 1992, PGD cost $2000-3000 per
cycle in addition to the $7000-8000 for IVF. Id. Egg retrieval ranged from $67,000
for the first cycle to $114,000 for the sixth cycle (1994 statistics). Botkin, supra note
2, at 18. Eighty-five percent of IVF costs are not covered by insurance. Id.
176 Parens & Knowles, supra note 6, at S6 (stating the greatest risk is from the
ovarian hyperstimulation drugs).
177 FitzPatrick, supra note 27, at 30.
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maintaining it to its full life capacity. 178 Therefore, any potential
for full life may be disregarded. This argument, however, fails to
consider the inevitability of survival. 179  As with embryos
produced in vitro,180  over time, the right life-sustaining
technology is likely to be discovered. A focus on survival
circumvents rather than addresses the real issues. If survival
were dispositive of legal consideration, then we could, at our
discretion, euthanize the terminally ill and infants born without
chance of survival-most notably, anencephalic babies. In the
end, the real issue is not viability at all. The real issue is how
one views human biological life at its very earliest stages. It is
precisely because views on this subject differ, and may influence
the PGD decision, that it should be left to the decision-makers to
evaluate, following specific disclosure. This is especially true
178 See Bielanska et al., supra note 35, at 1304-05.
179 Researchers have been experimenting on fertilization techniques for a half a
century. Harold Varmus suggests that 1944 is the date of origin, when Miriam
Menkin and John Rock first observed human in vitro fertilization. Harold E.
Varmus, The Challenge of Making Laws on the Shifting Terrain of Science, 28 J. L.
MED. & ETHICS 46, 49-50 (2000) (keynote speech). Another author reports that the
first external fertilization of a mammalian egg was performed in 1959 while the
first human egg fertilization occurred in 1971. Th. Shannon, In Vitro Fertilization:
Ethical Issues, in EMBRYOS, ETHICS AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS 155, 157 (E. Baruch et
al. eds., 1987). Baby Louise Brown, the first successful IVF-conceived baby, was
born seven years later. Varmus, supra, at 50. The development of survivable
blastomeres is likely to take the same discovery route-provided that there is an
interest in the end. Research has been underway for developing an artificial zona
pellucida to contain the developing embryo for a decade. See Jones et al., supra note
63, at 426; Richard Bronson, A Case of Identical Twins, Contexts (Institute for
Medicine in Contemporary Society, Stony Brook University), Mar. 1998, available at
http://www.uhmc.sunysb.edu/prevmed/mns/imcs/contexts/clone/twins.html (where
Hall and Stillman used alginate in the early 1990s to create an artificial zona in
which to grow blastomeres severed from embryos whose fertilization by two sperm
prevented survival beyond a few divisions). Scientists are currently working on
improving the proliferation of severed blastomeres. Bielanska et al., supra note 35,
at 1305 (noting that the purpose was to have more cells available for testing). The
study also included the insertion of (mouse) blastomeres into a zona and implanted
into recipients. Id. at 1310. This suggests the further study of blastomeres as
potential reproductive entities.
1so Before baby Louise Brown was a twinkle in the eye, scientists were faced
with some of the same issues presented here. In the early seventies, TVF technology
and methodologies were still under construction, so all the attempted and actualized
embryos perished. Scientists were "well aware that this work present[ed] challenges
to a number of established social and ethical concepts." R.G. Edwards & Ruth E.
Fowler, Human Embryos in the Laboratory, 223 SCI. AM. 4454 (1970). Nevertheless,
they opined that "the emphasis should be on the rewards that the work promises in
fundamental knowledge and in medicine." Id. Nowhere did the scientists fail to
recognize that embryonic life had been created.
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since the intervention is more deeply linked with personal beliefs
than is typical for medical treatment.
An additional reason that consent to cloning cannot be
considered implied relates to industry standards. IVF clinicians
have been cautioned to notify clients who wish to donate
supernumerary embryos to science that cloning could occur.181 If
the ASRM considers the fact material to the donation decision,
then there is no reason to treat PGD authorizations differently.
Governmental policies provide further insight into the
materiality of the severed blasotmere's clonal nature. If
governments were homogeneous in their endorsement of PGD,
then perhaps a practitioner should be entitled to an inference of
consent based on the clinician's reasonable expectations.
Disparate views, on the other hand, would suggest that
practitioners should not benefit from the evidentiary rule that
permits actors to infer consent absent express verbalization to
the contrary. 182
States differ in their acceptance of PGD, as do foreign
countries. Ten states ban all research on embryos. Of these, a
little more than half make an exception for PGD.18 3 Based on
such statistics, a uniformly favorable policy toward PGD can
hardly be inferred.18 4 The same is true for foreign countries.
181 See Embryo Splitting for Infertility Treatment, 67 FERTILITY & STERILITY 5,
4S-5S (1997) ("Persons asked to donate gametes or embryos for such research
should be fully informed that research in embryo splitting is intended or planned as
a result of their donation.") (statement developed by the American Society for
Reproductive Medicine ("ASRM")).
182 See DOBBS, supra note 56, at 56-57 (explaining the applicability of the
evidentiary rule).
183 See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Rights of Embryo and Foetus in Private Law, 50
AM. J. COMP. L. 633, 640 (2002) (noting that six states exempt preimplantation
screening); see also Richard M. Doerflinger, Ditching Religion and Reality, 2 AM. J.
BIOETHICS 31, 31 (2002). ("[Twenty-nine] states have legal declarations that human
life begins at conception or fertilization, and nine states prohibit harmful
experimentation on human embryos. Louisiana even defines the embryo fertilized in
vitro as a juridical person.") (internal citations omitted).
184 Even in those states that grant an exception, it is not clear that the
legislatures considered the cloning issue. It would not be the first time legislation
was premised upon an incomplete or incorrect understanding of the relevant
scientific issues. See generally Henry T. Greely, Banning "Human Cloning' A Study
in the Difficulties of Defining Science, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 131, 132, 142 (1998)
(explaining that some legislative products are a result of lack of understanding or
bad drafting, while others, such as the Feinstein Bill, deliberately-and nearly
invisibly-craft a loophole). According to a Westlaw search, conducted on October
19th, 2004, there are no federal or state cases about PGD.
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One study revealed that policies toward PGD ranged from
outright ban to absence of regulation. 8 5 The United Kingdom,
for example, has taken a somewhat liberal position. The Human
Fertilization and Embryological Authority ("HFEA") has adopted
a standard that embryos before the age of fourteen days may be
subjected to experimentation. The authorizing agency thus
permits PGD-but only under certain circumstances.18 6 By way
of contrast, Germany18 7 is at the other end of the spectrum.
Because a clone is created during the process, the German
Embryo Protection Act prohibits PGD.188  This lack of
governmental consensus further suggests that a severed
blastomere's clonal nature could be material to a PGD decision.
Even if the state in which the procedure were performed did
not prohibit PGD, one must examine other social standards to
determine whether a clinician may invoke the benefit of implied
consent to counter assertions of materiality. Religious
perspectives provide one reliable measure, since religion plays a
central role in personal attitudes toward the various
reproductive technologies.1 8 9 Disagreement between religions
185 See Thornhill & Snow, supra note 38, at 25 n.142. In the absence of a clear
policy about PGD, one can also examine policies regarding cloning. Members of the
United Nations have been considering a world-wide ban on cloning for at least two
years. Id. Currently at least forty nations want all forms of cloning banned,
scientific as well as reproductive. See Cloning: U.S. Again Seeks Worldwide U.N.
Cloning Ban, BioTech Watch (BNA) (Sept. 29, 2003).
186 Roberts, supra note 1, at 11. The HFEA will authorize PGD when there is a
genetic test available to avoid implantation of diseased babies, but will not
authorize PGD just to match tissues with a diseased "sibling." See Nelson, supra
note 18, at 10. Therefore, the HFEA refused to authorize PGD for purposes of
conceiving a tissue donor sibling for Charlie Whitaker, who suffered from Diamond
Blackfan Anaemia, for which there is no genetic test. See id. The HFEA did
authorize PGD for the Hashmi family. See id. Although they were permitted to
match the tissues, it was because the process enabled them to eliminate diseased
embryos. See id. This suggests that the HFEA recognizes that there is a moral line
to be drawn; thus there is room for others to draw the line differently.
187 See Regina Kenen, Genetic Screening of Embryos Could Harm Society, in
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 121, 132 (Carol Wekesser et al. eds., 1996). Norway,
Austria, and Australia also ban or oppose PGD. See id.
188 See de Wert, supra note 11, at 650. German concern over the moral status of
early human life has materialized into a policy that permits only three embryos to
be produced, all of which must be implanted under the Act. See Helga Kuhlmann,
Crisis Pregnancies in the Age of Human Genetic Diagnosis: Women's Right to Self-
determined Pregnancies and the Right of the "Other," in DESIGNING LIFE?
GENETICS, PROCREATION AND ETHICS 93, 96 (Maureen Junker-Kenny ed., 1999).
189 See Genetics & Pub. Policy Ctr., Phoebe R. Berman Bioethics Inst. at Johns
Hopkins Univ., Research Highlights: Adding the Religious Public's Voice to the
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can be explained by different beliefs about the moral status of
pre-implantation human biological life. 190
Since PGD involves the production of clones, one may
consider religious perspectives on PGD to approximate those of
cloning. As is true for governments, there is no uniform belief.
Conservative religions, which comprise the largest population
group, would prohibit the interventions.191 This is because non-
therapeutic interventions would impermissibly compromise the
dignity and full respect that must be accorded to nascent human
life.1 92 According to this view, since science has shown that
biological life begins at fertilization, any doubts about moral
status should be resolved in favor of granting full human
dignity. 193
Most of the more liberal religions would neither ban nor
promote, but would accommodate the pace of science and social
Debate, (Sept. 2003). A recent Gallup poll substantiates this with its recent survey
indicating that between 84% and 94% of the U.S. population considers religion to be
an important part of their lives. See How Important is Religion to Americans?,
MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 4, 2003, at 2E (reprinting statistics from Gallup poll). Thirty-
six to 56% of Americans polled considered religion as "very important"; 35-47%
considered religion "fairly important"; and only between 6 and 16% considered it
"not very important." Id. See also Celia F. Fisher, A Goodness-of-Fit Ethic for
Informed Consent, 30 FORDHAM URBAN L.J.159, 161 (2002) (accommodating moral
values as important in consent).
190 See Michael R. Panicola, Three Views on the Preimplantation Embryo, 2
NAT'L CATH. BIOETHICS Q. 69, 69-71 (2002) (providing insight on the three
predominant views on the moral status of the human embryo: the "personal"
position, the "pre-personal" position, and the "nonpersonal" position). The "personal"
position on the moral status of early biological human life is that fertilization marks
the time that full respect and dignity must be accorded because that is the time
when personal life begins. Id. at 71; see also Roberts, supra note 1, at 1.191 See Courtney S. Campbell, Cloning Human Beings: Religious Perspectives on
Human Cloning, at D-22, 32-35, 37-39 (paper commissioned by the NBAC),
available at www.georgetown.edu/research/nrcbl/nbac/pubs/cloning2/cc4.pdf (last
visited Jan. 13, 2005) (analyzing why African-American churches (with respect to
reproductive cloning), Orthodox Christians, Conservative Evangelical Christians,
and Roman Catholics would likely prohibit human cloning). Together, this group
comprises almost seventy percent of the religious U.S. population. See id. at D-21,
D-32, D-33, D-37. Muslims have been included in this group as well. See generally
Fadel, supra note 174, at 155-57 (explaining why Islam has declared cloning
unlawful).
192 See Panicola, supra note 190, at 72-74 (according to the "personal" position
regarding the moral status of early biological human life).
193 See id. The gravity of making an improper choice to disregard the moral
status of pre-implantation life (if one could know it to be improper in an absolute
objective sense) can be seen by clinical example. In one publicized study of eleven
patients, ninety-nine embryos were produced and biopsied, which resulted in
sixteen transfers and four pregnancies. See Escudero et al., supra note 86, at 1531.
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deliberation. 194 This middle ground position suggests that there
may be some doubt about the moral status of early biological life,
but these doubts need not be resolved by taking "the morally
safest course. ' 195 According to this view, respect, but not full
human dignity, must be granted because the human organism
has no individual personhood until the blastomeres have lost the
ability to differentiate fourteen days after fertilization. 96 This
position finds it significant that blastomeres may, after primitive
streak development at day fourteen, separate and form twins.
Therefore, it is only then that an entity is unique and entitled to
respect as a human individual.19
7
Only a few religions would permit outright some form of
cloning. 198 Such a position is consistent with a "nonperson" view
of the pre-implantation embryo. As such, no respect or
protection is owed.199  The basis for this belief rests in a
consideration that early human life forms are incapable of self-
consciousness, and sentience does not begin until at least six-
weeks post-fertilization. 200
Based on the brief explanation of a variety of religious
viewpoints, one can reasonably infer that clients' perspectives
regarding the production of a blastomere clone are unlikely to be
uniform. Because perspectives differ, a biopsy practitioner
cannot take for granted that clients would consider the fact of
blastomere clone production during PGD immaterial to the
decision. Thus, consent cannot be regarded as implied.
194 Campbell, supra note 191, at D-21-32, D-35-37 (listing African-American
Churches (research cloning), Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, Native
American, and some Mainline Protestant Christians); see also Jane Maienschein,
What's in a Name: Embryos, Clones, and Stem Cells, in Stem Cell Research: A
Target Article Collection, 2 AM. J. BIOETHICS 3, 15 (2002) (noting that some Jewish
and Muslim scholars, for example, would not object because they do not believe that
life begins until day forty).
195 Panicola, supra note 190, at 79.
196 See id. at 77-79.
197 See id. at 78. Under this view, however, it would be logical to conclude that
clones such as Dolly (were she human) would not be considered a separate
individual person because of its derivation from another life of the same genetic
component. See id. at 81.
198 Campbell, supra note 191, at D-35-37. Some of the Mainline Protestant
Christians (who constitute seventeen percent of the religious population) would
permit research cloning. Id. This group is comprised of American Baptists, Disciples
of Christ, Episcopals, Evangelical Lutherans, United Methodists, Presbyterians,
and members of the United Church of Christ. Id. at D-35-36.
199 Panicola, supra note 190, at 75.
200 Id. at 83-84.
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Characterization of the PGD decision as not primarily
medical 20 1 further enhances the strength of personal autonomy
and "individualized values" as the guideposts. 202 Unlike medical
decisions that rely on a physician's expertise, 203 a decision to
undergo PGD reflects a moral choice 20 4 that even physicians
acknowledge as important. 205 Valuing personal ethics when
making decisions about whether to condone the production and
subsequent destruction of blastomere clones to assist in selecting
the "right" embryos for implantation would be consistent with
general attitudes about genetic206 and reproductive decisions-
including those related to IVF 207 and prenatal testing.208 Since
201 Bonnicksen, supra note 10, at 411 (embryo manipulations are not medically
necessary). Unlike the medical norm, PGD along with other assisted reproductive
technologies serve to circumvent rather than treat any underlying condition. See
Noah, supra note 8, at 652. Moreover, ART as a whole differs significantly from
medical procedures because it provides special services as well as a product: babies.
See BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 18, at 15-17; Judith F. Daar, Regulating
Reproductive Technologies: Panacea or Paper Tiger?, 34 HOuS. L. REV. 609, 616, 656
n.259 (1997). Men and women are seen as "consumers of reproductive services and
products." BLANK & MERRICK, supra at 17.
202 See Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 900-
01 (1994) (stating that the greater the privacy interests, the greater the respect for
autonomy and "individualistic values"). Respect for dignity and its concurrent
consent requirements means that a practitioner "must prefer the patient's interests
to her own." Id. at 921 (emphasis in original). "The more private the choice-that is,
the more it concerns the integrity of the individual's own projects and self-
conception and the less it directly affects others-the more robust this [individual
autonomy] should be." Id. at 924. Thus, individual choice as to whether PGD is an
offensive touching is distinguished from whether this person should be eligible for
access to PGD.
203 See Katz, supra note 84, at 69 (discussing a rationale for maintaining
physician authority over decision-making as based on the physician's superior
knowledge, the patient's incapability in making medical decisions, and physician
altruism safeguarding abuse of their professional authority). Conflict-of-interest in
the multi-billion dollar reproductive technology industry seriously erodes the
altruism rationale.
204 See Roberts, supra note 1, at 9 ("Provided the parents are not hindered by
their view of the moral status of the embryo, PGD can obviate the twenty-five
percent to fifty percent risk of passing on specific genetic abnormalities.").
Reproductive decisions as a whole involve a moral perspective not present in other
kinds of medical decisions. Therefore, greater deference to personal values should
occur. See Botkin, supra note 32, at 291. Jeffrey Botkin, for example, raised the
issue of informed consent concerns as an ethical issue with respect to the use of
PGD. Botkin, supra note 2, at 25 (concerned about the lack of oversight over PGD,
and the "value-laden context of PGD").
205 Elias, supra note 4, at 1570.
206 See Pelias & Markward, supra note 162, at 839-40.
207 See Bonnicksen, supra note 10, at 419. Not everyone agrees on the
"allocation of authority between individuals and society in the area of reproductive
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deeply felt personal moral judgments form the basis of the
decision about whether to authorize PGD, facts upon which the
decision must rely are material and must be disclosed for
consent to be effective. 209 Thus, failure to explain the clonal
nature of the embryo biopsy that precedes the preimplantation
diagnosis renders the intervention a battery.
decision-making." Carl H. Coleman, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the
Constitution, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 57, 59 (2002). When consumers would choose to
implant more embryos than can reasonably flourish, limiting their choice to do so
may seem particularly appropriate. See Noah, supra note 8, at 629, 636-37. Some
would qualify a couple's autonomy under some circumstances. For example, some
practitioners would deny access to intracytoplasmic sperm injection ("ICSr') unless
the man either submits to genetic testing or agrees to PGD. The reason is that there
is a high frequency of genetic or chromosomal anomalies in subfertile males who
require the ICSI treatment to conceive. de Wert, supra note 11, at 654. To overcome
subfertility in men, ICSI is sometimes used in conjunction with IVF. As its name
implies, fertilization is accomplished by inserting a single sperm cell directly into
the egg's cytoplasm. Tasca & McClure, supra note 2, at 8.
The limitations on autonomy seem to relate to rights-based arguments. See, e.g.,
Norton, supra note 11, at 1623-28; Alvare, supra note 23, at 38, 56 (constitutional
analysis revealing no protected right to collaborative reproduction through ART,
and noting the connection between rights-based arguments, ART, and cloning). That
is not the sense of autonomy under discussion in this article. The focus here is on a
couple's right to be informed of material information that would enable the them to
discern whether touching related to PGD would be offensive to them. The question
of whether autonomy should be limited when the touching would be unoffensive is a
different, and perhaps subsequent, issue that also must be addressed. One way
would be to re-examine the definition of autonomy in the rights-based context.
While de Wert believes that practitioners who limit access to ART under defined
circumstances rightly limit autonomous choice, another interpretation is that those
practitioners have simply incorporated a natural law view of autonomy.
208 See Judith F. Daar, Regulating the Fiction of Informed Consent in ART
Medicine, 1 THE AM. J. BIOETHICS 19, 19 (2001) (noting that decisions about
medical treatment are frequently made because of "fear, emotion and religious
beliefs," which have nothing to do with scientific or medical accuracy). See also
Suter, supra note 20, at 263 (where the point of disclosure [of the implications as
well as the risks of prenatal testing) is to enable patients to incorporate their own
personal values in the decision about whether to undergo the testing).
209 See Botkin, supra note 32, at 285. This gives effect to societal views about
the importance of autonomous decision-making that gave rise to the doctrine of
informed consent. See Scott, supra note 39, at 266 (where, in cases of conflict,
autonomy trumps beneficence). The spirit of the doctrine was meant to foster, not
inhibit, conversations that would result in decisions that incorporated ethical
reflection. Id. at 295-96. See also Gatter, supra note 105, at 961 (where patient
autonomy is protected not by the consent document, but by meaningful participation
through doctor-patient discourse).
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CONCLUSION
PGD clients are likely to disagree about the morality of
producing blastomere clones. While some may view the
production as morally licit, others would consider it morally
unacceptable. A third group may be uncertain about the virtue
of cloning for diagnostic purposes. This group can be further
subdivided. Some might consider PGD preferable to other
selection alternatives once the decision has been made to
undergo IVF to achieve pregnancy and to birth only "healthy"
babies. PGD could be depicted as less invasive than pre-natal
diagnosis, 210 as posing fewer risks to a surviving embryo than
amniocentesis, 211 and as avoiding the moral quandary of
abortion. 212  Others in this middle group may conclude
differently, reasoning uncertainty about the morality of cloning
outweighs the advancement that of personal reproductive
interests.213 Clients may decide differently based on the fact of
blastomere clone production. Therefore, this fact is material to
the decision.
When the information is withheld, clients are prevented
from making a reasoned decision that is guided by their own
deeply felt moral beliefs. They are also subject to potential
manipulation by practitioners who may have different value
preferences than their clients. 214 Unlike clients, practitioners
210 See Ephross, supra note 85, at 466. Given the manipulation to the woman's
body during IVF treatment, the idea that PGD is less invasive seems strange.
Perhaps the author considered invasiveness only in the TVF context.
211 See id.
212 Elias, supra note 4, at 1570; Kuhlmann, supra note 188, at 97; see also C.
Cameron & R. Williamson, Is There an Ethical Difference Between Preimplantation
Genetic Diagnosis and Abortion?, 29 J. MED. ETHICS 90 (April 2003) (arguing that a
pre-implantation embryo need be accorded less respect than an implanted embryo
to whom the mother has developed an emotional attachment).
A gnawing concern is that PGD technology allows couples to eliminate embryos
that they would not choose to abort. Thus, while avoiding the specific abortion
quandary, couples are faced with a different ethical query involving eugenic choices.
See Cecchin, supra note 21, at 112; Robertson, supra note 9, at 450-51. On the other
hand, Lori Andrews suggests that, unlike abortion, once couples have made the
choice to utilize IVF, implantation decisions are made for rather than against.
ANDREWS, supra note 53, at 164-65.
213 See Robertson, supra note 9, at 452 (stating that some may find PGD
"symbolically distateful").
214 See Gianaroli et al., supra note 41, at 310 ("mhe major goal is to provide the
best of our own scientific knowledge and technical possibilities for the birth of
healthy children."); Katz, supra note 84, at 75 (revealing the need for dialogue
between the clinician and patient).
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are likely to have value preferences based in science, which often
conflicts with moral values. 2
15
Because there is no consensus on the morality of producing a
blastomere clone, disclosure must go beyond detailing the
technical procedures and risks to embryos whose blastomere is
removed and tested. In place of the distracting information that
causes confusion about the fact of cloning, 216 decision-makers
will need direct statements that these blastomeres, unlike those
removed for stem cell research, have the potential to fully
develop. Although the procedure's focus does not envision
survival, the fact of clone production has significance. Unlike
biopsies of somatic cells for diagnostic information, the
consequence of performing an embryo biopsy is the production of
a new body with independent biological significance. This fact
Manipulation is relatively easy. Counselor-controlled presentation of the
questions, information, and options leads to client-receptivity to the choice favored
by the presenter. Kass, supra note 5, at 8. A serious problem is that, contrary to
popular misconception, the scientific view of human life is not morally neutral. Id. It
is grounded not on the reverence for human dignity that distinguishes Man from
animal, which some scientists wish to dismiss as anachronistic "tribal" theology, but
on a humanist position that elevates curing disease and prolonging life as the
principles worthy of moral power. Id. at 11-12, 14-15.
215 FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 71, at 117 (quoting from Martin S.
Pernick, The Patient's Role in Medical Decisionmaking: A Social History of Informed
Consent in Medical Therapy, in 3 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, MAKING HEALTH CARE
DECISIONS 3 (1983)); see also Edmund Pellegrino, The Physician's Conscience,
Conscience Clauses, and Religious Belief: A Catholic Perspective, 30 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 221, 234-36, 241 (expressing concern that medical school applicants are asked
to state their views on reproductive technologies and other religiously sensitive
issues, and the reduction of moral values in medicine).
216 See, e.g., Fred Guterl, To Build a Baby, NEWSWEEK, June 9, 2003, at 70
(discussing tissue matching for Molly Nash through PGD, the potential for
commodifying children and the specter of eugenics, the article leads one to infer the
absence of cloning: "While the world panics over false claims of human cloning, PGD
is quietly transforming reproductive medicine."). The use of the term "biopsy" is
itself distracting. While it certainly conveys the message of testing, it infers the non-
importance of the cell being tested. Some popular media altogether skip the
"biopsy," just mentioning that the IVF embryos were "tested." While mentioning the
potential for abuse, the focus was on the benefits of eliminating disease and
debunking the fear. See Jerome Groopman, Designing Babies, WALL ST. J., March 4,
2002, at A14. Some of the PGD pioneers prefer the acronym "BABI" (blastomere
analysis before injection). See WINGERSON, supra note 68, at 50. In general, there is
a lack of public understanding about genetics and genetic technology, and
institutions "prey on this dearth of general knowledge." Pelias & Markward, supra
note 162, at 854 (stating that lack of public understanding leads to bans on
experiments rather than making beneficial use of the outcomes of the HGP).
Another factor is the distraction of noting that the host embryo is not affected,
diverting attention away from the totipotency of the cell removed.
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alters the nature of the biopsy procedure and must be disclosed
in light of the varied views among decision-makers, who are in a
better position than clinicians to evaluate the moral significance
of the procedure. 217
The absence of consensus and the lack of medical necessity
for the procedure mandate that practitioners cannot rely on a
"reasonable person" perspective to bolster implied consent or to
defend against charges that no consent has been proffered based
on the inadequate provision of material information regarding
the nature of the procedure. Devoid of specific disclosures, a
clone will involuntarily be produced because effective consent to
PGD does not exist. Those who perform the intervention thereby
inflict a battery.
217 See Maureen L. Condic & Samuel B. Condic, The Appropriate Limits of
Science in the Formation of Public Policy, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 157, 161 (2003) (noting that science is about possibilities rather than
morality). Thus, clinicians are likely to come from a different perspective than their
clients.
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